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On 18 November, a fire broke out in a 
popular housing block inhabited mostly by 
migrant workers in Beijing’s Daxing district, 
killing nineteen. Citing the need to ensure 
safety, in a matter of days the local authorities 
forced tens of thousands of ‘low-end people’ 
(diduan renkou) to abandon their dwellings in 
the suburbs of the Chinese capital, showing 
absolutely no regard for their livelihoods. 
Families who had moved from all over China—
and had, in some cases, lived in Beijing for 
years—were effectively thrown out on the 
street and left to their own fate in the freezing 
northern winter. In just a few days they lost 
everything, a cruel reminder of the precarity 
inherent to the life of the Chinese migrant.
This issue of Made in China includes a series 
of essays that examine different declinations 
of precarity. We open the thematic section 
with two essays that frame precarity in 
general terms. In A Genealogy of Precarity 
and Its Ambivalence, Coin presents a brief 
conceptual history of precarity, focussing on 
the evolution of precarious labour over the 
past three decades. In Work Precarisation 
and New Inequalities, Perocco looks at 
the vicious circle that links precarity and 
migration. Shifting our attention to China, 
in Class and Precarity in China, Smith and 
Pun question the nexus between these two 
concepts, demonstrating that the boundary 
between regular and non-regular work is 
far from static. In From Dormitory Regime 
to Conciliatory Despotism, Siu probes the 
new social, technical, and gendered divisions 
of labour inside Chinese garment factories. 
In The Precarity of Layoffs and State 
Compensation, Solinger looks into the policy 
processes that have led to the emergence of 
urban poverty in China and at the prospect of 
poverty alleviation. Finally, in How China’s 
Environmental Crackdown Is Affecting 
Business Owners and Workers, Fuchs and 
Schmitt describe the human consequence of 
China’s intensified environmental crackdown 
in Chengdu.
This issue also includes two essays on 
Chinese society. In Migrants, Mass Arrest, 
and Resistance in Contemporary China, 
Ma considers how migrants are commonly 
perceived as criminals in China and assesses 
how this bias is reflected in mechanisms 
of crime control, as well as in the judicial 
and correctional systems. In Counting 
Contention, Elfstrom explains why it is so 
difficult to find accurate data about strikes in 
China. The Window on Asia section features 
two pieces. In the first, Boom or Bust in 
China’s Jade Trade with Myanmar?, Møller 
outlines the history of commercial exchanges 
of jade between China and its southern 
neighbour, and gauges the impact of the 
recent anti-corruption drive on this market. 
In the second, In the Absence of a Peasantry, 
What, Then, Is a Hong Kong Farmer?, Lou 
ponders the reasons for, and implications of, 
the absence of a discourse about peasantry in 
the former British colony.
The cultural section comprises three 
essays. In Industrial Landscapes of Socialist 
Realism, Smith surveys the fate of a very 
peculiar form or socialist art in China and 
North Korea; in Datong, Forever in Limbo, 
Kinkel reviews The Chinese Mayor, a 
documentary about a politician and a very 
ambitious plan; finally, in Resurrecting 
the Dead, Franceschini ponders the 
contemporary relevance of Old Tales Retold, 
Lu Xun’s final oeuvre of fiction. We conclude 
by interviewing Ching Kwan Lee about her 
new book on Chinese labour in Africa, The 
Specter of Global China.
This journal is hosted by the website 
Chinoiresie.info. If you would like to receive 
this journal regularly by email, please 
subscribe to our mailing list. 
The Editors
Balancing Acts: 
Precarious Labour in 
Contemporary China
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Between 18 and 24 October, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) held its Nineteenth 
National Congress. In his three-hour-long 
Report, General Secretary Xi Jinping heralded 
the dawn of a new era for socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, an age in which the contradiction 
between ‘unbalanced and inadequate development 
and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better 
life’ has replaced that between ‘the ever-growing 
material and cultural needs of the people and 
backward social production’. While not directly 
referring to workers, the Report went to great 
length to highlight the many achievements of the 
CCP in improving people’s livelihoods (minsheng). 
Xi cited as evidence of these improvements the 
fact that government policies have lifted sixty 
million people out of poverty. He also recognised 
that employment is key to people’s livelihood, 
citing the steady creation of thirteen million 
urban jobs per year. The Report recommended 
policies to facilitate and improve the quality of 
employment, including expanding skills training 
and encouraging entrepreneurship. Since urban 
citizens have seen their incomes increase at a 
faster rate than China’s economic growth, with 
the ‘middle-income’ group continuing to expand, 
the CCP called upon the government to play a 
role in income redistribution to narrow income 
disparity. Furthermore, Xi pointed to the success 
of establishing a better social security system, 
Chinese Communist Party 
Holds Nineteenth National 
Congress
with efforts to expand the coverage of healthcare, 
pensions, unemployment insurance, and affordable 
housing. Xi concluded this section of the Report by 
pointing out that because of these efforts, society 
is stable and national security is strengthened as 
a result. 
Despite the Report’s claim that China is led by 
the working class in alliance with the peasantry, 
references to workers are few and far between. In 
the entire text, ‘migrant workers’ (nongmingong) are 
mentioned only once, in a passage that encourages 
migrants to maintain multiple avenues for finding 
employment. The Report also made no mention of 
the household registration system (hukou or huji), 
a fundamental issue for rural migrants. References 
to ‘workers’ (gongren) are only made to state that 
the country is led by the working class, and to call 
on the CCP to expand membership among many 
groups, including workers. There is one further, 
brief reference to ‘employees’ (zhigong) in relation 
to improving the old-age pension system for urban 
employees. 
The most explicit reference to labour relations 
comes in a section on the tripartite collective 
negotiation mechanism. This tripartite system 
has been promoted since the 1990s, but has only 
taken on a sense of urgency in the last decade, as 
more and more workers have organised themselves 
to demand higher pay and better conditions. The 
Report states that a tripartite mechanism in which 
the government, official union (representing 
workers), and enterprises negotiate wages and 
labour conditions will contribute to a more just 
and orderly income distribution, as well as to more 
harmonious industrial relations. However, it must 
be noted that the push for tripartite collective 
negotiation has stalled in recent years and that the 
Report makes only one reference to trade unions, 
where it demands that mass organisations become 
more political, progressive, and mass-based, in 
order to more effectively serve as transmission 
belts between the Party and workers. In sum, it 
appears that even in the new era there will be very 
little that is new for China’s working class. KL
(Sources: Party Congress Report in Chinese; 
Party Congress Report in English)
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The Good Samaritan Law 
Comes into Effect
Human Rights with Chinese 
Characteristics?
On 1 October, the General Rules of Civil Law—a 
collection of general principles of Civil Law—came 
into effect. Article 184 is generally referred to as 
the ‘Good Samaritan Law’, stating that those who 
attempt to aid others in emergency situations will 
not be liable under any circumstances. This clause 
aims at solving the dilemma of people who, after 
helping an injured person, end up falsely accused 
by the victim of having caused the injury in the 
first place. The scope of the article has been the 
subject of numerous discussions that have resulted 
in Chinese legislators producing different drafts of 
the rule over the years. The core of the controversy 
concerns the definition of gross negligence in the 
process of rescue, and the general tendency of 
Chinese law to look at anyone connected to a loss 
to share that loss, regardless of their level of fault. 
The provision comes in the wake of a number of 
incidents widely reported by the Chinese media, 
in which either bystanders showed egregious 
indifference to suffering, or victims who had 
received assistance sued their helpers. One of the 
most iconic cases took place in Nanjing in 2006. 
That year, a young man named Peng Yu helped 
an old woman to get to the hospital after she 
was injured while getting off a bus. In return, he 
was sued for his troubles. In that case, the court 
decided against him, stating that ‘no one would 
in good conscience help someone unless they feel 
guilty’, causing a public furor (although in 2012 it 
turned out that Peng was actually guilty). In 2011, 
China was shocked by the case of Wang Yue, a two-
year-old toddler who passed away after having 
been run over by two vans while being ignored by 
passersby. More recently, in June this year, a video 
went viral in China, in which a woman was hit by 
a vehicle and then was left unaided until a second 
vehicle killed her. EN
(Sources: BBC; Caixin; China Digital Times; 
National People’s Congress; The China 
Collection; The New York Times; Xinhuanet;)
On 7 December 2017, about three hundred 
participants from over fifty mostly developing 
countries gathered in Beijing for the ‘South-South 
Human Rights Forum’. In his opening address, 
President Xi Jinping reiterated that ‘human 
rights must and can only be promoted in light of 
specific national conditions and people’s needs.’ 
The initiative took place after another string of 
harrowing events. On 17 October, the Chinese 
authorities claimed that Gui Minhai—a Hong 
Kong bookseller who mysteriously disappeared 
two years ago in Thailand before resurfacing in 
mainland China, imprisoned on charges related 
to a drunk-driving incident that had occurred 
more than ten years earlier—had been released, 
but since then there has been no further news 
about his whereabouts. In early November, the 
police in Liaoning province arrested human 
rights lawyer Li Yuhan on unknown charges. On 
7 November, dissident writer Yang Tongyan, who 
had been in detention since 2006 and had nearly 
completed a twelve-year sentence for subversion, 
died from a brain tumor barely three months after 
having been released on medical parole. Later the 
same month, two more activists—lawyer Jiang 
Tianyong and Taiwanese human rights activist 
Lee Ming-che—were respectively sentenced to 
two and five years imprisonment on subversion 
charges. There has been little reaction from the 
international community. In late October, foreign 
media reported that a human rights panel at the 
United Nations had called on China to release 
and compensate three prominent human rights 
activists—Christian church leader Hu Shigen 
(condemned to seven and half years in detention), 
lawyer Zhou Shifeng (condemned to seven years 
in detention), and the aforementioned Xie Yang. 
On 10 December, international Human Rights 
Day, the European Union Delegation and United 
States Embassy to China both released statements 
expressing concern about ‘China’s ongoing denial 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. IF 
 
(Sources: China Change; China Digital Times; 
China News Service; EU Delegation to China; 
South China Morning Post 1; South China 
Morning Post 2; The Guardian 1; The Guardian 2; 
The New York Times)
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China Continues to Extend 
Influence over Foreign 
Publishing and Universities
In the months following the uproar caused by the 
Cambridge University Press censorship fiasco 
(see Loubere and Franceschini in Made in China 
3/2017), the Chinese government has continued to 
exert pressure on foreign publishers operating in 
the country. In late October, it was revealed that 
Springer Nature, one of the largest commercial 
academic publishers in the world, had capitulated 
to the Chinese censors, blocking access to at least 
one thousand ‘politically sensitive’ articles on 
their Chinese website. The publisher defended 
the decision by saying that only 1 percent of 
total content had been ‘limited’, and claiming 
that it was necessary to comply in order to avoid 
wider restrictions. In mid-November, Australian 
academic Clive Hamilton went public saying that 
Allen & Unwin withdrew his forthcoming book 
Silent Invasion: How China Is Turning Australia 
into a Puppet State, due to fears of defamation 
litigation. In late November, SAGE Publishing 
warned that they might be required to censor 
content or be pushed out of the Chinese market. 
The increasing assertiveness of Chinese censors 
and their zeal to push foreign publishers to self-
censor in order to access the large Chinese market 
has resulted in numerous headlines and petitions. 
However, despite the high-profile coverage, the 
response from the wider academic community 
outside of China-focussed social sciences has been 
largely apathetic. Beijing’s efforts to influence 
foreign academia have not been limited to the 
publishing sphere. In mid-November, over two 
thousand foreign-funded joint venture universities 
in China were instructed to set up party units and 
give the new party secretaries a role in decision 
making through seats on institutional boards. This 
decision comes at the end of a year filled with 
continuous controversy about Chinese influence 
in higher-education institutions abroad. NL
(Sources: BBC; Financial Times 1; Financial 
Times 2; Financial Times 3; Reuters; The New 
York Times)
Beijing Evicts ‘Low-end 
Population’
On 18 November, a fire broke out in the basement 
of an apartment block inhabited mostly by migrant 
workers in Beijing’s Daxing district, killing 
nineteen and injuring eight. Around four hundred 
people lived in cramped conditions in the two-
story structure. In the aftermath of the tragedy, 
the city authorities launched a forty-day campaign 
to inspect and demolish buildings that unlawfully 
mixed residential and industrial facilities, as well 
as overcrowded apartments. This led to a wave 
of evictions that mostly affected the migrant 
population of the Chinese capital, with thousands 
of migrants forced out of their residences and 
left homeless in spite of the cold temperatures. 
As part of the campaign, officials also shut down 
small plants, shops, and restaurants, in some cases 
going as far as to cut electricity and water without 
any notice. While state censors were quick to 
take control of the media narrative, for a few days 
Chinese social media was abuzz with discussions 
and denunciations of how the crackdown was 
targeting Beijing’s ‘low-end population’ (diduan 
renkou), a term that first appeared in official 
debates a few years ago referring to those who 
work in low-end service and manufacturing jobs, 
and that more recently has come back in vogue in 
relation to plans to cap the capital’s population at 
twenty-three million by 2020. Since the beginning 
of the campaign, the crackdown has drawn 
widespread condemnation from the Chinese public. 
Some migrant communities took to the streets in 
an attempt to resist, and more than one hundred 
intellectuals signed an open letter demanding an 
end to the evictions. Even some state media have 
been unusually critical. On 27 November, Beijing 
Communist Party Chief Cai Qi declared that the 
campaign should not be carried out in a simplistic 
and hasty manner, and that those evicted should be 
given time to move out. While addressing serious 
problems of safety, the campaign is also part of a 
broader move to change the face of the Chinese 
capital. IF 
(Sources: BBC; Caixin Global; China Digital 
Times; China Media Project; People’s Daily; 
Quartz; Reuters; South China Morning Post 1; 
South China Morning Post 2)
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Foxconn Entangled in 
Another Scandal
On 21 November, Foxconn came once again under 
the spotlight following a media investigation into 
its forced use of seasonal student interns. The 
Financial Times uncovered that three thousand 
high school students from the local Urban Rail 
Transit School had been forced to work eleven-
hour shifts at the company’s plant in Zhengzhou, 
Henan province, to produce the new iPhone X. 
Since the early 2010s, Foxconn has been repeatedly 
criticised for illegally using student interns (see 
Chan’s essay in Made in China 3/2017). As recently 
as July this year, a university offered a public 
apology for forcing its students into a three-
month internship at a Foxconn factory in Yantai 
in Shandong province (see the brief in Made in 
China 3/2017). While admitting the violation 
of the rules regarding overtime, the company 
insisted that student internships were voluntary, a 
fact that was contradicted by the Financial Times 
investigation. The next day, on 22 November, 
Foxconn announced it had taken immediate action 
to address the violations. However, by that time, 
as the busy season from August to December was 
coming to an end, the use of student interns had 
already become unnecessary. Such practices have 
been found across electronics manufacturers. 
In October, the Hong Kong-based labour rights 
group, Students and Scholars Against Corporate 
Misbehaviour, reported that vocational school 
students were forced to work at Quanta Computer, 
which supplies global brands such as Apple, Acer, 
Hewlett-Packard, and Sony. Local governments 
have been complicit in allowing such practices 
to prevent businesses from relocating to other 
regions where labour is cheaper and more flexible. 
KL
(Sources: Financial Times 1; Financial Times 2; 
Sina News (Chinese); The Guardian)
New Implementation Rules 
for the Counter-espionage 
Law Released
On 6 December, the State Council released the 
Implementation Rules for the Counter-espionage 
Law that had come into force earlier in November 
2014. The new Rules significantly enhance the 
powers of the State Security, which already 
had gained significant clout under the original 
legislation. In particular, according to Article 
8 of the new Rules, the State Security gains the 
power to investigate acts of subversion that are 
not necessarily related to espionage, including 
situations involving ‘fabricating or distorting facts, 
publishing or disseminating text or information 
that endangers national security, or creating, 
transmitting, or publishing a/v products or other 
publications that endanger national security’; 
‘using religion to carry out activities endangering 
national security’; and ‘foreign individuals 
[violating] the relevant provisions, not [heeding] 
discouragement, and, without authorization, 
[meeting] with mainland persons who have conduct 
endangering national security or who are strongly 
suspected of having conduct endangering national 
security’. Article 6 also expands the concept of 
‘funding’ espionage to include providing funding 
to those who engage in espionage even if the 
money is not used for that aim and the funder is not 
aware of the illegal conduct. This will significantly 
reinforce the hand of the State Security in dealing 
with activists and NGOs working in politically 
sensitive areas, as well as serve to intimidate their 
foreign donors. As noted in previous issues of 
this journal, since Xi Jinping has come to power, 
the Chinese leadership has displayed increasing 
concern with matters of national security. In 
2013, the Chinese Communist Party established 
a new secretive National Security Commission, 
and in November 2014, the Chinese government 
passed the Counter-espionage Law, followed a few 
months later by the National Security Law. Since 
2016, 15 April has been labelled ‘National Security 
Education Day’, i.e. a day for raising public 
awareness about national security issues.  IF
(Sources: China Law Translate 1; China Law 
Translate 2; South China Morning Post 1; South 
China Morning Post 2)
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In Chinese society today, migrant workers 
are commonly perceived as criminals. This 
can be clearly seen in various mechanisms of 
the crime control regime, with the migrant 
population being stopped and searched 
more frequently than local populations, and 
experiencing a disproportionately high rate 
of police arrests and pre-trial incarceration. 
Migrants are also more likely to receive longer 
sentences, to be denied parole and probation, 
and to receive discriminatory treatment in 
the correctional system.
To address existing biases in the arrest rate 
of migrant suspects, between 2011 and 2015 
more than twenty first-tier cities in China 
initiated legal reforms. Still, when I was doing 
fieldwork in major cities in the Yangtze River 
Delta back in 2015, prosecutors explicitly 
acknowledged that in their daily work they 
simply followed the principle of ‘arresting 
all’ (yilv shiyong jiyaxing qiangzhi cuoshi) 
when it came to migrant suspects. In their 
Ma Tian
In today’s China, migrant workers are commonly 
perceived as criminals. This essay examines 
how this bias is reflected in mechanisms of 
crime control, as well as in the judicial and 
correctional systems. It also looks into the 
strategies adopted by migrants to cope with this 
kind of discrimination by the law enforcement 
bodies. 
Migrants, Mass Arrest, 
and Resistance in 
Contemporary China
12
Photo: Yi Cheng Sun, Flickr
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opinion, the reforms were ‘totally infeasible, 
contradictory, and utterly ridiculous.’ 
Similarly, policemen I interviewed in Ningbo 
during that period affirmed that they had 
never even heard of the new legislation. 
Apparently, the ambitious reform programme 
outlined in official legal documents had 
essentially come to naught. This failed 
reform highlights how hukou status still plays 
a fundamental role in determining how the 
police and judicial bodies in China deal with 
different types of suspects.
Hukou Disparity in Arrest 
Decisions
It is a fact that prosecutors in China are 
more prone to issue or approve an arrest 
warrant for migrant suspects. For instance, 
according to internal documents of the 
local Procuratorate, in Ningbo in 2010, the 
arrest rate for the migrant population was 
368 arrests per 100,000 people—7.36 times 
higher than the rate for local residents. In 
light of this, the police find it easier to target 
migrants, as their arrest is more likely to 
be officially sanctioned. This dynamic of 
mutual reinforcement not only engenders 
discrimination against migrants, but also 
leads to a disproportionate arrest rate within 
this social group—in fact, we can talk about 
this phenomenon as being a form of ‘mass 
arrest’.
Far from being simply the result of the 
personal preferences of individual police 
officers, this bias has been systematised, 
rationalised, and legalised. Article 5.6 of the 
Quality Standards for the Examination of 
Arrest Requests by People’s Procuraturates 
provides specific procedural instructions to 
legal professionals, mandating that if ‘the 
criminal suspect has no fixed residence, 
or commits crimes from place to place or 
in different places, and does not possess 
the conditions for bail or residential 
confinement’, he shall be arrested. One of 
my interviewees, a prosecutor from a district 
procuraturate in Shanghai, confirmed that 
it was this link between the absence of a 
‘fixed residence’ to a ‘non-local hukou’ that 
resulted in the establishment of standardised 
arrest guidelines in China. In this way, the 
creation of a causal link between migration 
and criminality has resulted in a major bias in 
the approval rate of arrest warrants targeting 
migrants. 
Besides being legalised and institutionalised, 
this logic is also enshrined in routine 
everyday practice. Migrants are discursively 
equated with crime, and thus with instability 
and danger. Given the risk that migrants 
could ‘run away’, positive arrest decisions 
targeting this kind of suspect are justified 
as essential to ensure the defendant’s return 
for subsequent proceedings. However, this 
apparent necessity is, in actuality, based on 
an illogical assumption formalised through 
the law.
Coping with Police 
Discrimination
My research shows that the benefits of the 
judicial reforms of the early 2010s have not 
trickled down to migrants. When suspected 
of a crime, they still found themselves 
stuck in the Kafkaesque position of being 
subject to relentless interrogations and 
arrests due to their hukou status rather 
than actual misbehaviour. In such recurring 
circumstances, migrants have no choice but 
to cope with the police strategically. 
Article 10 of the Regulations on Detention 
Centres of the People’s Republic of China 
stipulates that criminals have to go through 
a health check prior to detention, and lists 
three medical conditions under which they 
cannot be detained: a) Mental illness or 
acute infectious disease; b) Other serious 
illnesses that may be life-threatening while 
in custody or for which they can not take care 
of themselves (this does not apply to those 
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who are extremely dangerous to society); and 
c) Pregnancy or breastfeeding of children less 
than one year old. Taking advantage of these 
legal guarantees, many migrants attempt 
to place themselves into these scenarios in 
order to evade arrest and detention. The most 
common coping strategies include putting 
oneself in a life-threatening situation for 
male migrants, and pregnancy or simply 
cuddling a baby for female migrants.
In my interviews, the police continually 
complained about how ‘crafty’ (jiaohua) 
migrant suspects are nowadays. They vividly 
described their encounters with migrants 
who, in order to avoid arrest, swallowed 
blades, coins, keys, zips, screws, nails, nail 
clippers, and even saws. These occurrences 
were regarded as complicated and difficult to 
resolve. A policeman told me a story about a 
migrant ‘thief ’ who used to carry nails with 
him at all times. ‘After we caught him, he 
swallowed the nails instantly. The detention 
centre (kanshousuo) carries out X-ray checks 
for all incoming detainees before taking them 
into custody. If they see things like these in 
their stomach, they will not accept them.’ 
Under these circumstances, he continued, 
‘We had to let him go… After being released, 
he continued to steal. Then he went through 
prosecution and trial. Although the court 
sentenced him to prison, the jail still did 
not want to take him. What can we do? He 
continues to steal, but our hands are tied. 
There is nothing we can do.’ 
This process of ‘othering’ was repeated in 
encounters between the police and suspects, 
enhancing the discursive framing of migrants 
as having violent and irrational tendencies. 
In some cases, this discourse overlaps with 
other narratives and concerns related to 
specific ethnic minorities. For instance, 
Muslims from Xinjiang are often marked out 
for their ‘savageness and aggression’. As one 
police officer told me: ‘We caught several 
people from Xinjiang. Once he put some 
blades into his mouth, and then chewed the 
blades. Lots of bloods came out of his mouth, 
I was frightened to death, we just let him go.’ 
Female migrants often use motherhood to 
avoid arrest. In his master’s dissertation, Li 
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Chengdu, North Train Station. Photo: Phoootoooos, Flickr
Weiming found that in Shanghai numerous 
organised crime groups from Hunan province 
recruit women who are pregnant or have a 
small baby. A woman told Li how she came 
to join the group: ‘My townsfolk told me that 
nowadays pregnant women are all doing this. 
They said: “You are pregnant. What a pity if 
you don’t do this!” ’ Sometimes, women have 
abortions after months of pregnancy, and 
then get pregnant again just to stay out of jail. 
Blurred Morality and 
Resistance
This essay certainly does not intend 
to glorify migrant coping strategies, or 
suggest that migrant suspects are activists 
leading a non-violent life in a context of 
apartheid. However, their actions cannot 
only be understood as a devious way to avoid 
criminal charges. From feigning illness to 
skipping a class, to soldiers deliberately 
harming themselves in order to escape the 
war; from espionage agents taking a cyanide 
pill to avoid torture, to people grabbing a 
baby at the very last minute to gain a seat 
on a lifeboat, it is never easy to distinguish 
between courageous acts and irresponsible 
cowardice. These examples all demonstrate 
that resistance is a complex set of actions 
that go against an established order. In other 
words, resistance—or the act of saying no—is, 
by its very nature, contentious.
Facing the real possibility of arrest and pre-
trial incarceration, migrant suspects look 
for alternatives for self-redemption. There 
are two layers of ‘resistance’ in the coping 
strategies outlined in this essay. The first 
layer lies within the offender’s noncompliant 
behaviours during his or her interactions 
with the police. In this case, rather than 
being verbally or physically aggressive, the 
resistance is actually non-violent. It is a 
tangible, subtle, even silent act. The second 
layer resonates with the idea of resistance 
or rebellion in cultural criminology. As Jock 
Young pointed out in The Criminological 
Imagination, ‘resistance is always there’. 
Self-harm and pregnancy should also be seen 
as ‘forms of resistance’ against discriminative 
policing. At a disadvantage in the criminal 
justice system, migrant suspects change their 
own bodies to resist the asymmetrical power 
relationships between themselves and those 
administering ‘justice’. For these subversive 
migrants, nails in the stomach and foetuses in 
the womb become a type of protection from 
discriminatory incarceration. 
Ma Tian
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In August 2017, activist Lu Yuyu was 
sentenced by the Dali City People’s Court 
to four years in prison for ‘picking quarrels 
and stirring up trouble’ (xunxin zishi zui). 
Together with his partner Li Tingyu, who 
was detained but then eventually released, 
Lu had collected information on thousands 
of ‘mass incidents’ (qunti shijian). These 
incidents encompassed a broad range of 
Chinese contentious politics, from pitched 
battles between farmers and thugs hired 
by development companies, to taxi drivers 
parking en masse along roadways in protest 
against high fuel prices; and from migrant 
workers threatening to jump from bridges, to 
retirees gathering to condemn pollution. Li 
and Lu posted the information they gathered 
on social media and blogs under the name 
Wickedonna (also known as feixinwen, non-
news). Their reports usually took the form of 
short, two- or three-sentence descriptions of 
confrontations, paired with photos or videos. 
But the activists also calculated monthly and 
yearly totals of periods of unrest, accompanied 
by brief analyses. 
It is impossible to know what, exactly, 
triggered the initial detention of the pair in 
June 2016. Drawing data of this sort together 
in one place was clearly unsettling for 
authorities. But what exactly was so troubling 
about it? One possibility is that making 
individual stories of conflict so accessible 
was dangerous. The activist Huang Qi was 
detained half a year earlier because of his 
work curating similar tales on his website 
64 Tianwang. Most likely, though, the sheer 
number of incidents Lu and Li recorded 
undercut government narratives related to 
the creation of a ‘harmonious society’ (hexie 
shehui) and bringing about the ‘great revival 
of the Chinese people’ (zhonghua minzu de 
weida fuxing). After all, the government itself 
used to sporadically make public annual 
incident counts, but it stopped doing so 
in 2005, presumably because the numbers 
conveyed a negative impression of where the 
country was headed. 
Manfred Elfstrom
In the past few years, a growing number of 
academics and activists have launched projects 
aimed at counting contention in the realm of 
Chinese labour. This essay explores the power 
and limitations of such efforts, detailing the 
inevitable data problems involved in any 
quantitative approach to documenting protests 
in China. It also examines the ethics involved in 
how we collect such data and the questions we 
ask of it.
Counting 
Contention
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Wickedonna represented a particularly 
dedicated and courageous effort at counting 
Chinese unrest. However, a growing number 
of academics and activists have launched 
similar projects—albeit mostly from the 
safety of universities and non-governmental 
organisations located outside the mainland. 
These projects include an extensive dataset 
covering all types of disturbances put together 
by Chen Chih-Jou of the Academia Sinica; my 
Ash Center colleague Li Yao’s dataset of all 
the mass incidents reported in Boxun between 
2001 and 2012; the ‘China Environmental 
Protests & Accidents’ map covering 2005 
to present; China Labour Bulletin’s (CLB) 
strike map of workplace unrest from mid-
2011 to present; my own China Strikes dataset 
covering the Hu–Wen decade; and the Global 
Labour Conflicts collection hosted by the 
International Institute of Social History in 
the Netherlands, which combines the maps 
from CLB and myself for its China section. 
In this essay, I will explore the power and 
limits of such efforts with regard to Chinese 
labour issues. I will begin by contrasting 
the practices of digging deep (qualitative 
research) versus counting (quantitative 
research), and posit that both have their 
virtues. Then, I will detail the inevitable 
data problems involved in any quantitative 
approach to documenting protest in China, 
while arguing that these problems, although 
serious, should not deter researchers. Finally, 
I will examine the ethics involved in how we 
collect such data and the questions we ask of 
it.
Digging Deep versus 
Counting
Research about Chinese labour politics 
to date has tended to involve in-depth 
fieldwork (digging deep). Scholars have 
worked on production lines themselves or 
interviewed strikers in cafes outside factory 
gates. They have also put in less adventurous, 
but sometimes equally demanding, time 
navigating the Chinese bureaucracy to 
buttonhole labour officials and trade union 
leaders. This is as it should be. To a certain 
extent, you have to physically be ‘there’ to 
‘get it’. There are also good reasons to be 
suspicious of statistics in labour studies. 
Quantitative data introduces the temptation, 
often subconsciously, to begin to make 
the sorts of assumptions about rational 
individuals and limited options that have 
led mainstream economics astray. Numbers, 
moreover, necessarily omit the voices of 
workers themselves. No econometric take on 
the industrial revolution, for example, will 
ever have the humanity of E.P. Thompson’s 
exploration of the many forces that ‘made’ 
the English working class. And most basically, 
with regard to China in particular, reliable 
quantitative data is simply not available for 
many aspects of the country’s economy and 
society. 
Nevertheless, counting unrest, where it 
is possible, serves at least two important 
purposes. First and most importantly, it can 
give us a sense of the general trends that 
underlie individual cases and how those 
trends interact—an imperfect sense to be 
sure, but a sense all the same. While a close 
analysis of a single strike at a single factory 
can challenge our ideas of how things ‘work’ 
in China and provide us with important 
clues as to the mechanisms of change at the 
grassroots level, we should not use a single 
case—or five or ten or twenty cases—to make 
claims about how most conflicts play out. 
Labour scholars generally include in their 
qualitative work various asides about limited 
external validity, but they nonetheless too 
often leave the distinct impression that they 
are really talking about where China as a 
whole is headed, caveats notwithstanding. 
You simply cannot do this with a country so 
big and complex. 
Second, and this is maybe not so obvious, 
the process of counting itself is illuminating. 
Reading strike report after strike report can 
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help you develop a rough sense of what the 
norms are for conflicts, something which is 
hard to come by if you are not yourself involved 
in activism on the ground. At the very least, 
you develop a feel for the norms of reporting 
a conflict. Thus, for example, I have noticed 
that coverage of public bus strikes in Chinese 
state media tends to take the following form: 
‘Today, many people waited for their buses 
for hours but none came. This reporter went 
to the bus station to investigate. Drivers were 
standing around. They had several important 
complaints. When asked about the issue, the 
transportation bureau said that they were 
putting together a team to investigate….’ 
Then, when you read something that deviates 
from the expected story arc, it makes you take 
notice. You know that it is an outlier—and you 
wonder what has changed.
Counting contention has yielded useful 
findings in other labour contexts. For 
example, sociologist Beverly Silver’s Forces 
of Labor, which describes how worker 
militancy chases particular industries around 
the globe, continues to be a touchstone for 
many scholars (and has been translated into 
Chinese, winning it a new circle of readers 
there). Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly’s 
examination of the size and frequency of 
strikes in France from approximately the 
mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries 
draws together national politics and shop 
floor dynamics in an illuminating manner. 
Graeme Robertson’s study of Russian labour 
protests under Yeltsin and Putin similarly 
documents fascinating interactions between 
workers and elite actors in a hybrid regime. 
Works like these do not rely on perfect data 
(Silver’s World Labor Group dataset uses 
articles from The New York Times and The 
Times of London to cover unrest the world 
over), but they are nonetheless revealing. 
There is no reason this work should not 
be extended to the world’s second largest 
economy and largest working class. However, 
any quantitative approach to China must be 
balanced by extra close attention to the data 
problems and ethical issues involved in how 
we go about gathering and using numbers. I 
turn to these next. 
Data Problems
If we are to begin counting, we must address 
the problems with the data available to us 
upfront. The most obvious problem is with 
totals. Everyone naturally wants to know 
how often, and in what numbers, workers are 
protesting in China. However, it is unlikely 
that any individual or institution actually 
has this information—not even the Chinese 
government. CLB has tried to be clear that 
their strike map likely only represents a 
small sample of the full ‘population’ of unrest 
occurring. Nonetheless, media outlets have 
repeatedly treated the CLB map as a more 
or less accurate measure of year-to-year 
changes in contention. This problem has 
sometimes extended to scholars. At one point 
in her thought-provoking 2016 article in the 
Journal of Asian Studies, which was the focus 
of a discussion in a previous issue of Made 
in China, Ching Kwan Lee contrasts CLB 
figures with numbers she obtained from the 
Shenzhen City Labour Bureau and Ministry 
of Public Security in the 1990s and early 
2000s, concluding that ‘the current period 
is actually witnessing a decline, not a rise, in 
strikes’. But surely the government sources 
Lee cites, while themselves imperfect, convey 
a more complete picture than CLB. Although 
her broader point stands—there was a lot 
of protest before, too, and academics are 
overstating today’s conflict—the precise 
comparison made is thus inappropriate.  
Other problems relate to more subtle 
issues of bias. Although a surprising amount 
of information is reported from poorer and 
more remote parts of the country, more 
data will always be available for a place 
like Guangdong than Gansu. Guangdong, in 
particular, is home to a relatively open press 
(especially the Southern Media Group), 
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scores of bloggers and social media gadflies, 
and foreign journalists—and it abuts Hong 
Kong. Whether the imbalance in reports from 
different places is wildly out of sync with 
the imbalance in actual instances of unrest 
is a question that is important but almost 
impossible to answer. There are also biases 
in terms of sources. Dissident media outlets 
are unsurprisingly better at documenting 
violence against workers by police or thugs, 
whereas state media makes sure to always 
describe the steps taken by officials to resolve 
a dispute. There may also be biases that 
manifest themselves over time, as censorship 
tightens and slackens, and news cycles come 
and go. Statistically, these issues can be 
dealt with by using only one source for all 
reports (so that the biases are predictable), 
by including fixed effects, by zeroing in on 
dynamics in a particular region, or by seeing 
what happens when all observations with 
more than a certain number of incidents are 
dropped (to ensure that the story is not just 
related to one of the hotspots). The main 
thing, though, is to be honest about the data’s 
limitations. 
The Questions We Ask
Not all the dangers of counting relate to 
issues of samples versus totals or bias in 
terms of sources or cycles of reporting. We 
should also consider the real-world impact of 
what we are trying to learn with quantitative 
data. As with qualitative research, sometimes 
the easiest questions to answer are not the 
ones that matter most. Moreover, focussing 
on certain issues over others means serving 
certain interests over others. Traditional 
studies of strikes by labour economists have 
focussed on the number of incidents, number 
of participants, or the number of workdays 
lost. These figures are tracked by many 
governments (although not China’s) and 
obviously have a big impact on an economy. 
But why not put more energy into rigorously 
documenting the different types of worker 
claims made? Claims may matter more to 
discussions of class consciousness. When you 
have thousands of ‘dots’ representing disputes 
marked on a map—the default of software 
programs like the one I use for my China Strikes 
map—it is natural to wonder why they cluster 
in some places and not in others. However, 
workers and their allies may not need lessons 
about what causes mobilisation. Instead, they 
may be more interested in its consequences: 
which tactics are effective and which are 
not, where in the country breakthroughs are 
possible, etc. In contrast, state authorities 
and businesses have an intense interest in 
understanding the roots of contention: they 
just want to stop protests! As has been well-
documented in the media, big data is now 
being harnessed to track individuals and 
groups in China in disturbing ways, such as 
via the country’s proposed new social credit 
system. The American military, meanwhile, 
is devoting substantial sums to predicting 
social upheavals with its Minerva grants. The 
protest maps assembled by labour researchers 
are unlikely to be as comprehensive as these 
projects and so should not raise the same 
level of concern. But research can always be 
turned to multiple purposes. It is important 
for scholars to ponder what purposes their 
research most easily serves. This sort of 
awareness is the least we owe people like Lu 
Yuyu and Li Tingyu who have sacrificed their 
freedom to document what is happening. 
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Precarious Labour 
in Contemporary 
China
Francesca Coin
Focussing on the conceptual evolution of 
precarious labour over the past three decades, 
this essay provides a genealogy of the notion of 
precarity. On the eve of the fourth industrial 
revolution, when precarity has become the 
norm and fears of a jobless society have 
alimented a dystopian imaginary for the future, 
this historical reconstruction seeks to identify 
those elements that have shaped the material 
conditions of workers as well as influenced 
their capacity of endurance in times of growing 
uncertainty.
A Genealogy of 
Precarity and Its 
Ambivalence
My generation—or probably most 
individuals who were born since the late 
1970s—has often perceived precarity as a 
generational curse, and looked at Fordism as 
a time of social and labour stability. On the 
contrary, Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter’s 
article Precarity as a Political Concept, or, 
Fordism as Exception reminds us that for 
us to understand precarity, we must move 
beyond such approaches to see Fordism as 
an exception and precarity as the norm. In 
fact, the 1960s and 1970s were decades of 
uncertainty. The Federal Reserve’s monetarist 
experiment in 1979 transformed labour 
into an adjustment variable of its monetary 
policy. In this context, the de-standardisation 
of salaries and the individualisation of 
contract relationships came with an overall 
transformation of governance and labour 
management that tied income to profit and 
transformed labour into the shock absorber 
for capital risk. Since then, casualisation of 
employment, insecure income, and labour 
dislocation became the defining traits of 
labour relations. Time softens the hard edges 
in our memories, but accounts from those 
years provide descriptions of a society in 
Workers of World Unite! Graffiti by Banksy
22 MADE IN CHINA - FOCUS
turmoil, mired by plant foreclosures and 
rampant job losses.
In the United States, the monetarist 
experiment suddenly brought unemployment 
to levels unseen since the Great Depression. 
In several cities, manufacturing plants that 
had been the symbol of industrial growth 
either shut down, introduced severe cuts in 
the workers’ salaries, or started laying off 
employees. Modernity seemed to be going 
downhill rapidly. In several industrial cities, 
unemployment peaked at over 20 percent 
in the early 1980s, often leading people to 
flee to other places to find work. In some 
instances, manufacturing jobs vanished into 
obsolescence due to technological changes; 
in others, they drifted overseas in the search 
for cheaper labour. In retrospect, we know 
that what was happening was a major global 
restructuring of labour relations. Over the 
past decades, the increase in productivity 
allowed by science and innovation became 
the catalyst for a transformation in labour 
relations characterised by a growing distance 
between emerging clusters of high-tech 
industries and the Global South’s dependency 
on technologically advanced multinational 
corporations. Inequality was not limited to 
macroeconomics but was reflected in the 
growing cleavage between a higher rank of 
high-tech specialists and a growing reserve 
of low-skilled precarious workers.
The Experience of the 
Italian Autonomia
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Italian 
leftist movement autonomia turned to Marx’s 
Grundrisse to define this transition. In this 
work, Marx foresaw that innovation and 
technology would become a direct force of 
production and allow employers to become 
relatively independent of the labour force. In 
other words, capital could use ‘the inanimate 
limbs’ of science and technology to restrict 
necessary labour, hence transforming 
innovation into a curse likely to increase 
unemployment and social insecurity. At the 
same time, the purpose of technology would 
not only be the limited to the accumulation 
of wealth. On the contrary, the general 
intellect could use technology to improve 
the conditions of production and liberate 
time—what Marx defined as ‘the general 
reduction of the necessary labour of society 
to a minimum, which then corresponds to 
the artistic, scientific etc. development of the 
individuals in the time set free.’ The fact is 
that the ‘inanimate limbs’ of science are not 
outgrowths of nature, Marx warned. ‘They 
are organs of the human brain, created by the 
human hand,’ and in this sense ‘they are the 
material conditions to blow this foundation 
sky-high’. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, these prophetic 
words became the distinctive tune of a 
generation. The diffuse intellectuality that 
took to the streets turned to the Grundrisse 
to decipher the historical transition they 
were enduring. No longer wanting to be 
constrained within the space and time of the 
plant, Italian autonomia posited itself as an 
embodiment of the ‘general intellect’ that felt 
an urge to liberate society from its chains. The 
simplicity of their slogans beautifully explains 
the complexity of their interpretation. 
‘Zero work for income 
Automate all production 
All power to living labor 
All work to dead labor’
The revolution is over, 
we’ve won’  
A/traverso, 1977 (Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi).
Despite the cultural distance that separates 
us from those years, it must be said that 
recent literature has rediscovered those 
perspectives. From Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams’ Inventing the Future: Post-
capitalism and a World without Work to 
Paul Mason’s Postcapitalism: A Guide to 
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Our Future, intellectuals have turned to 
these interpretations in order to compensate 
for today’s social and political impasse. 
Liberation from labour and the ‘struggle to be 
human and educated during one’s free time’, 
emerge in Mason’s analysis as the vision of a 
post-capitalist society that can grow inside 
the old one.
From Utopia to the Race 
to the Bottom
The problem in these visions is that they 
never came true, and the enchanting idea 
of a world free from work left room for a 
generalised race to the bottom where labour 
was often not only unfree but unpaid. The 
transition to post-Fordism could be defined 
as a general dismantling of the time and 
space boundaries established by Fordism. 
According to Antonio Negri, the mass worker 
that characterised the years of Fordism gave 
way to the ‘social worker’—an individual 
whose life was entirely put to work. While 
industrial capitalism was founded on large 
factories, specialised in the production 
of mass, standardised goods and marked 
by a clear separation between the time of 
production and the time of consumption, 
post-Fordism annihilated such divisions. 
In the social factory, the creation of value 
extended beyond the factory walls to embrace 
the whole of society. 
In this context, the question became 
what type of organisational mechanisms of 
control could be used to supervise a labour 
force that was ever more fluid and free to 
move beyond space and time constriction. 
In 1978–1979, Michel Foucault’s course at 
the Collège de France, La naissance de la 
biopolitique, analysed how the breakup 
of time and space constrictions that was 
typical of a disciplinary society transformed 
governance and management. In a post-
Fordist society, governance became micro-
political and used new techniques to enforce 
discipline. Deleuze spoke of a ‘society of 
control’characterised by the use of salaries 
to justify the coercion of individuals into a 
new relation of dependence. In this context, 
precarity became ‘the growing insecurity 
brought on by the flexible management of 
the global work force within post-Fordist 
capitalism. Today’s Uber drivers or social 
media ‘prosumers’, in some instances, embody 
this shift. The notion of the ‘prosumer’ 
refers to the ‘progressive blurring of the line 
that separates producer from consumer’, 
a definition that is often used to describe 
‘prosumer capitalism’ and the management’s 
attempt to outsource informal labour to 
consumers—a mechanism that defines both 
corporations such as Ikea and the political 
economy of social media. The progressive 
blurring of the line that separates leisure and 
work, as well as production and consumption, 
have come to define a type of capitalism 
marked by precarity—as manifested in the 
proliferation of temporary and casual labour, 
delocalisation and subcontracting, occasional 
labour, labour on demand, and unpaid work.
The New Dangerous Class?
Over the past ten years, the representation 
of precarity has been ambivalent. In his widely 
discussed book, Guy Standing describes the 
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precariat as ‘the new dangerous class’ and 
maintains that the precariat is not merely a 
distinctive socio-economic group but rather 
a neologism that combines an adjective 
‘precarious’ and a related noun ‘proletariat’, 
to describe ‘a class-in-the-making, if not yet 
a class-for-itself, in the Marxian sense of that 
term’. Standing’s representation of precarity 
refers to the early 2000s. During the 2005 May 
Day protest in Milan, for example, over one 
hundred thousand people took to the streets to 
voice the needs of the global precariat. These 
very assemblies and moments of collective 
action were considered pivotal in globalisation 
politics and crucial for the precariat to find 
its own voice. In her genealogy of precarity, 
Maribel Casas-Cortés looks at the activist 
networks that emerged in those years as ‘a 
Deleuzian politics of unfixed alliances’ that 
transformed the precariat into a political 
subject capable of intertwining identities 
and demands. In this sense, she drafts a set 
of concepts that could agglomerate social 
groups—from immigrants to young, educated 
locals—and a set of demands to be posed to 
governments. Intertwining the struggles of 
migrants, women, and precarious workers, 
Maribel Casas-Cortés argues that precarity 
seemed to represent ‘a strategic political 
proposal intended to use Deleuze’s “tool 
box” to change society’, as maintained by a 
EuroMayDay organiser that she interviewed. 
At the same time, it is absolutely evident 
that there is a tremendous distance between 
those empowered accounts of precarity and 
the conditions of social insecurity that have 
continued to afflict labour over the years. 
Today, employment insecurity has evolved 
into conditions even more challenging. 
The widespread use of unpaid labour in the 
‘internship economy’ and the prospects of 
uncertainty accelerated by the gig economy, 
obscures the idea of the precariat as a 
dangerous class and emphasises the raising 
insecurity facing it. As I look at the labour 
market from the rotten heart of Southern 
Europe, I wonder whether the artificial 
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description of precarity as a political 
subject did us any good. The bitterness of 
an unfulfilled revolution during the 1970s 
probably found comfort in representations 
of the precariat as a dangerous subject, but 
at the same time such narratives permitted a 
general underestimation of the violent forces 
confronting labour. It is going to take a very 
different sense of urgency and determination 
to reverse the conditions of exploitation that 
have become the new normal.
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In the neoliberal era, precarity has become a 
general condition in the life of workers. The 
structural precarisation of labour is a global 
process, which has taken place heterogeneously 
according to national contexts, sectors, 
qualifications, and labour market stratifications. 
This essay looks at precarity from two angles: 
the impact of it on migrant workers and the role 
of migration in the exacerbation and extension 
of it.
Work Precarisation 
and New 
Inequalities: 
The Role of Migration
Turning precarity into a general condition 
in the life of workers is one of the most 
important social transformations of the 
neoliberal era. The structural precarisation 
of labour is a global process, which has taken 
place heterogeneously according to national 
contexts, sectors, qualifications, and labour 
market stratifications. Besides young people, 
low-skilled older workers, and women, it 
has mainly affected migrants, who have 
suffered from labour precarity combined 
with the weakness of their legal and social 
status. At the same time, immigration is 
also involuntarily an agent of spreading 
and widening precarisation—often a testing 
ground where new forms of precarity are 
trialled before being extended to other groups 
of workers.
In this essay, I look at precarity from two 
angles: the impact of it on migrant workers 
and the role of migration in the exacerbation 
and extension of it. I first analyse the 
process of structural precarisation of labour, 
highlighting how it has become even more 
extreme in recent years. I then examine the 
precarisation of migration in Europe over 
the past two decades and its role in paving 
the way for a wider enlargement of precarity. 
Finally, I consider the Italian context as a 
striking example of this two-fold process. 
This analysis is highly relevant if we wish to 
better understand what has been happening 
in China since the onset of the reform era. 
In fact, while the Chinese context has arisen 
from a specific set of conditions (economic, 
social, political, and cultural), it nevertheless 
presents many similarities with the Italian 
context regarding the social transformations, 
the new inequalities, and the conditions of 
migrant workers.
Precarity 2.0
One of the cornerstones of the great social 
restructuring of the past three decades is the 
widespread and intense transformation of 
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Immigrant farmers in the Italian countryside. 
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the organisation of work and of the labour 
market—a composite yet unitary process. 
The features of these transformations may 
be summed up as follows: 1) organisational 
flexibility, i.e. the set of methods—from 
lean production to outsourcing, from just-
in-time to new management—which have 
produced the fragmentation and acceleration 
of production processes; 2) the systematic 
application of informatics and robotics to 
the production process, which has increased 
the polarisation of work and the de-skilling 
of a number of workers; and 3) the structural 
precarisation of labour. 
As one of the cores of neoliberal policies, 
the precarisation of labour is a prerequisite 
and a carrier of the intensification of labour 
exploitation required by the rules of the 
global economic order in response to the 
constant decrease of accumulation rates and 
recurring economic crisis. The fracture in the 
unity of the labour contract, the restructuring 
of labour law, the introduction of a plethora 
of contract types with different conditions 
and rights, are all part of a process which is 
broader and deeper than a mere reduction 
of guaranteed work spaces. Following a few 
decades in the wake of the Second World 
War, which saw the attainment of relatively 
stable and secure jobs, a radical and extreme 
commodification of labour has taken place.
The structural precarisation of labour 
has several consequences—including 
new stratifications, the growth in wage 
inequalities, the impoverishment of many 
groups of workers, the increase in the army 
of reserve workers (with the creation of a 
reserve of the reserve), the unconditional 
adaptation of workers’ lives to the 
organisational needs of private companies 
and public bodies, the alteration of social 
rights which have been readjusted for the 
benefit of companies, and the deterioration 
of psychological and physical health as 
precarity gradually destroys  people. Atypical 
contracts, at first applied among migrants, 
have fragmented and disconnected the labour 
force, enabling the general devaluation of 
labour, denying the role of workers in the 
process of production. The consequences 
have been so dire that rather than describing 
this as simply commodification of labour, in 
extreme cases we can actually conceptualise 
it as the nullification of labour and of the 
worker, who does not have and does not need 
to have anything guaranteed, who—exactly as 
migrant workers in racist representations—
have zero rights. 
With the recent economic crisis and the 
consequent radicalisation of neoliberal 
policies, labour precarisation has further 
expanded and deepened, going beyond 
precarity as it was known in the recent past. 
Now, precarity 2.0—typified by vouchers, 
meal tickets instead of wages, serial 
internships, volunteering, unpaid work, 
zero-hour contracts, temporary work, posted 
workers, fake cooperatives—has transcended 
the original boundaries of precarious labour, 
replacing a segment of the ‘first generation’ 
precarious jobs and becoming the norm.
The precarisation of labour, both in its old 
and new versions, has been unleashed on 
workers unevenly. The first, most affected, 
were migrants, young people, low-skilled 
and low-educated female workers with 
children, older workers affected by company 
restructuring, and then other low-skilled 
workers more generally—i.e. those who 
constitute the most vulnerable segment of 
the European working class. These groups, 
which do not constitute an individual class 
of their own, have experienced increased 
impoverishment and marginalisation, and 
their foreign components have also been the 
subjects of racist campaigns. 
Precarisation of Migration 
in Europe
Across the majority of mainland Europe, the 
precarisation of labour has markedly affected 
migrants. There are at least three primary 
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reasons for this: the migration policies of 
many European countries; the role attached 
to migration in European capitalisms and in 
the operation of the labour market; and the 
rise of anti-migrant racism in the 2000s. 
In several European countries, migrant 
workers are subject to a double precarisation, 
both in the work and legal sphere. With regard 
to the legal sphere in particular, the migration 
policies of many countries subordinate the 
migrants’ right of abode to the existence of a 
work contract, and also tie their social rights to 
their migration status, thus stratifying social 
rights. These principles have contributed to 
the return of the ‘guest worker’, which has 
taken place in a context of flexible capitalism 
with all its fragmentation and polarisation. 
The generalisation of the bond between 
the residence permit and the work contract 
during a period of structural economic crisis 
and casualisation puts migrants in a perilous 
and blackmail position, forcing them to 
accept any work conditions. The interaction 
between these two dimensions has produced, 
compared to the previous decades, a larger 
and deeper precarisation of migrants’ 
conditions. These migrants, torn between 
the rigidity determined by migration laws 
and the flexibility produced by labour laws, 
have found themselves as ‘guest workers’ 
attempting to navigate a context of economic 
stagnation, characterised by atypical 
contracts and the general weakening of the 
workers’ movement. Thus, if for the 1960s 
and 1970s we may talk about a relatively 
stable work regime, in the following decades 
the reality is that of a precarisation of the 
very process of work  insertion and, on the 
social part, the enhancement of exclusion or 
segregation factors. 
Historically, migration has been allocated 
the role of a reserve army and social buffer 
against possible crises within European 
capitalisms. In the last decade, this has 
intensified, so that migrant workers have 
been the first group experimented on with 
regard to the shift to precarious work and to 
the most extreme forms of precarity. In the 
meantime, the operating mechanisms of the 
labour market—selection, concentration, and 
specialisation—have continued to channel a 
good share of migrant workers into the most 
precarious and less paid sectors. This means 
that, in Europe, their working conditions—
from access to work to unemployment, 
from tasks to wages, from classification to 
mobility—still present disparities compared 
to national workers. There are large swaths 
of unemployment, underemployment, ‘over-
education’, and atypical contracts—all of 
which have become higher in percentage 
over time, and which have grown alongside 
crises. 
The rise of institutional racism has increased 
precarisation and reduced social rights. 
The anti-migration offensive has supported 
migration policies characterised by a mix 
of identity and security elements—aimed at 
curbing social rooting, and at supporting 
temporary and fluctuating migration, 
following the requests for a just-in-time 
workforce. The return of assimilationism, 
both in policy and rhetoric, has required 
maximum social adaptation by migrants to the 
conditions to which they are subjected. Mass 
media, in creating a racialised depiction of 
society, has served to produce a differentiation 
in the public representations of migrants 
which is functional to the differentiated 
exploitation deriving from their stratified 
precarity. Slogans and discourses focussed on 
a necessarily temporary presence, preference 
for national workers, and on a subordinated 
integration of migrants in the name of social 
inferiority, have paved the way for the 
precarisation affecting a vast majority of 
migrants as a racialised class segment of the 
European working class.  
At the same time, the role of migration as a 
carrier of precarisation must be highlighted. 
The labour market is segmented, but the 
spreading of precarity among migrant workers 
has been a factor of the multiplication and 
enlargement of precarity that has affected 
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a remarkable share of workers. In this 
framework, migration policies have played an 
important general role in paving the way and 
anticipating comparable labour laws. 
The process of downward convergence of 
migration policies—starting slowly in the 
1970s and 1980s, and gaining momentum in the 
1990s and 2000s—has affected a fair share of 
European states and has seen the confluence 
of the different migration policies into one 
single migration policy, which is selective, 
restrictive, and repressive, and which balances 
new migrant arrivals according to the needs 
of the labour market. Such processes have 
been accompanied by unceasing denigration 
campaigns targeting different groups of 
migrants, which have ended up affecting 
migration as a whole and, subsequently, a 
large share of the world’s labour, dividing it 
along distinct lines of differentiation. 
In this context, where migration is 
encouraged by the market and discouraged by 
institutions—according to a role play aimed 
at the social and political exploitation of 
migrants—the real purpose of this downward 
migration policy is not a complete stop 
to immigration, but rather an unstable, 
vulnerable immigration, which serves as a 
general devaluation of labour. Historically, 
the use of a migrant labour force has been 
one of the main leverages for the devaluation 
of the labour force as a whole. By lowering 
the cost of labour and by offering an ultra-
flexible workforce, migrants are forced 
into a subordinated position, and are liable 
to blackmail by migration policies and 
institutional discrimination. Today, this 
specific situation has turned migration 
into a laboratory where the manufacturing 
system has experimented with new forms of 
organising work—conceived of as a means of 
increasing profitability and productivity—
which have led to replacing secure jobs with 
precarious ones.
Migration and labour policies increasingly 
aimed at precarity have gone hand-in-hand. 
The creation of an institutionally weak and 
precarious proletariat, of an underclass of 
temporary workers replacing each other in 
constant rotation and circulation, has not 
only allowed the experimentation with new 
forms of labour exploitation to spread, but has 
also favoured a new global regulation of work 
relations and contracts in the name of stable 
precarity. The production of undocumented 
migrants, for instance, is an integral part of 
the structural precarisation of labour.
The Italian Case 
The hectic pace of labour market 
reformation, which has taken place in Italy 
over the past two decades, has legalised 
all forms of precarisation, many of which 
were first trialled on migrant workers. 
From the July 1993 agreement between 
the Government and trade unions, which 
paved the way for fixed-term and temporary 
employment, to the Jobs Act in 2014, which 
has institutionalised precarity by turning it 
into the norm rather than the exception, the 
task of creating a precarious labour market 
has been carried out in a bipartisan fashion 
through the promulgation of a long list of laws 
and provisions that have affected both ‘work 
flexibility’ and ‘employment flexibility’.
Simultaneously, immigration law has 
gradually established the connection 
between residence permits, work contracts, 
and housing—institutionalising a migrant 
work model based on forced illegality and 
social precarity. Law 40/1998 has explicitly 
legitimised the existing social practices, 
confirming that undocumented migration 
is unavoidable for migrants and that 
regularisation can only happen afterwards 
(with amnesties or specific decrees) 
according to the will of the employers. Law 
189/2002—which dictates that residence is 
strictly subordinated to employment—has 
redefined, restrictively, the prerequisites to 
right of abode with the introduction of a ‘stay 
contract’, thus creating a form of immigration 
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that is extremely susceptible to blackmail. 
This has placed the vast majority of migrants 
in a condition of structural, legal, and social 
precarity solidified by the labour law itself. 
The creation of an unbreakable bond between 
employment, residence permits, and housing 
guarantees means that migrants’ destinies are, 
to a large extent, in the hands of the employer—
the only person who may legitimately ask for 
a working permit for migrants and who has 
the subjective right to ask for a residence 
permit. Law 94/2009 has further worsened 
migrant conditions by introducing a point-
based residence permit, articulated in credits. 
As in a game of snakes and ladders, during the 
validity of the residence permit, migrants can 
obtain or lose points that will count towards 
the permit’s renewal. 
The fragmentation of residence permits 
types and the multiple durations of residence 
permits stipulated by immigration laws—
combined with the different kinds of atypical 
contracts stipulated by labour laws—have 
determined a marked stratification of the legal 
and social status of migrants. In other words, 
different types of migrants are granted, 
with several categories with different rights 
and conditions, which trigger a hierarchy 
of precarity within the very same migrant 
populations.
Pedagogy of Precarity 
and New Forms of 
Casualisation
Throughout the 1990s migrants have been 
channelled into the worst jobs, especially 
in labour-intensive sectors, with a high 
rate of irregular work. The shift to the 
industrial sector of the 2000s has entailed 
an improvement in the condition of migrant 
workers, yet they still take up proportionally 
more low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Migrant 
participation in the official labour market has 
increased, but the racial segmentation of the 
labour market has grown, and is matched by 
labour segregation and ethnicisation in the 
manufacturing processes. The manufacturing 
system, characterised by small and medium 
units, drawing on the more unstable or 
marginal segments in the labour market, has 
had a permanent reserve of cheap workers 
with which it could support the new forms 
of organisation of work. The working 
experience of migrants—with regard to tasks, 
classification, wages, accidents, and social 
security—presents severe disparities in 
comparison with national workers. Among 
them, we encounter the highest rates of 
unemployment (16.2 percent for migrants 
versus 11.4 percent for national workers), 
underemployment (11.7 percent versus 4.2 
percent), over-education (40.9 percent 
versus 21.6 percent), contract precarity, and 
intermittent work.
Within this situation, we find mass 
socialisation to precarity. As migrants enter 
the labour force, running the gauntlet of 
irregular work and undocumented migration 
before reaching a minimally stable situation, 
they often spend a long period experiencing 
the most exploitative labour practices in the 
country. In a sense, this can be considered 
a sort of ‘warming-up’ phase for permanent 
uncertainty and social inferiority. This 
stage, which affects migrants differently 
according to various factors, prepares them 
for a lifetime of precarious work. This is 
the cornerstone of Italy’s labour migration 
regime. This pedagogy of precarity is a pillar 
of the subjugation of migrants that began in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and was institutionalised 
in the 2000s. In terms of socialisation, it has 
enlarged to create a sort of halo effect that has 
affected other groups of workers, who at first 
had witnessed the precarisation of migrants 
thinking it would only be limited to them. 
In this context, migrants have been the 
‘guinea pigs’ for new forms of precarisation. 
Work paid with vouchers—used in Italy until 
March 2017 and currently under reform—
is just one example. This is a remuneration 
arrangement for accessory occasional work 
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that entails a remuneration of ten euros per 
hour before tax. Vouchers have no relation 
to a work contract, do not guarantee a day 
off, paid leave, sick leave, unemployment 
benefits, maternity or marriage leave, family 
benefits, nor loss-of-job indemnities. At first, 
in 2003, they were used for a few occasional 
activities carried out by specific categories 
(after-school tutoring, side jobs for students, 
and retired people), but later found wide 
application in sectors featuring a high rate 
of migrant labour—including domestic work, 
care work, and seasonal work in agriculture 
(harvesting). In 2015, 115 million vouchers 
were sold, corresponding to 1.1 billion euros, 
a third of which were used in the construction 
sector, and half in trade, tourism, and 
services. Vouchers then became a ‘universal’ 
tool, across all sectors, used for several jobs 
and for activities that are not necessarily 
occasional, and has partly replaced 
fixed-term precarious contracts. From a 
remuneration arrangement, it transformed 
into an employment arrangement, but in such 
evolution cases, the work relation no longer 
exists, channelling workers into a situation of 
extreme precarity. 
Advocating a Global Social 
Citizenship
There is a close connection between work 
transformations and alteration of social 
rights, between labour precarisation and 
social rights stratification. The effects of 
organisation flexibility and of contract 
precarity are not only visible in the hyper 
segmentation of the labour market and the 
rapid growth of under-employed people, but 
can also be seen in the erosion of labour rights 
and the restriction of social citizenship. In 
the case of migrants, labour precarity entails 
a considerable exclusion or segregation 
factor, as the exercise of social rights is 
often subordinated to the work contract 
or the residence permit. The return of the 
‘guest worker’ and the preference by states 
and markets for temporary migration, have 
favoured—in an era of structural precarity—a 
limited and conditional acquisition of social 
rights, generating new forms of inequality 
and a framework of stratified rights. All of 
this is supported by a strong xenophobia in 
the name of the welfare state. The attack 
on the social rights of the citizen has been 
going on for at least two decades as a fully-
fledged state policy aimed at altering the very 
structure and functions of these rights. Even 
though it started in the migration sphere, it 
has not been confined there, and has expanded 
to other segments of the population. For this 
reason, it is high time to consider the idea 
of a global social citizenship that may curb 
this downward slide into a future defined by 
structural precarity. 
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There is a general trend in capitalist societies 
with regard to the nature of employment 
contracts and relations. The old promise of 
formal or continuous employment following 
a probationary period is no longer the norm. 
It is increasingly harder to get into work, 
with competitive selection tournaments and 
rotating internships; and when employed, the 
length and security of contracts are changing, 
with zero hour contracts and agency work 
growing, and direct employment by the 
firm diminishing for new workers. These 
trends have prompted some to argue that a 
new class of precariously employed workers 
(the precariat) is emerging to challenge 
the ‘privileges’ of those who are securely 
employed. This internal conflict within the 
working class has been projected as more 
important than conflicts between labour and 
capital. This essay looks at these debates in 
China, where some writers are beginning 
to apply these ideas to argue that there is 
a structural bi-furcation in the Chinese 
working class.
The Precariat Thesis and 
China
In his conceptualisation of the rise of 
precarious work, Guy Standing suggests 
that internal divisions within the working 
class, between those in regular/standard 
employment, judged as being a privileged 
‘salariat’, and those excluded from standard 
employment contracts, considered as a 
disadvantaged ‘precariat’, forms the main 
‘class divide’ in contemporary capitalism. 
However, as Jane Hardy has pointed out, 
the problem with arguing that workers 
on regular jobs ‘are a privileged group’ is 
that it ‘completely denies the realities of 
life in the public sector, which has faced 
commodification, marketization and taken 
the brunt of austerity.’ Looking back at the 
history of capitalism, well-defined and 
comprehensive employment security was only 
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The increasing precariousness of labour forces 
globally has prompted some to argue that a 
new ‘precariat’ is emerging to challenge the 
privileges of the securely employed ‘salariat’. 
This divergence within the working class has 
been depicted as more significant than the 
traditional conflict between labour and capital. 
This essay examines these discussions in China, 
where precarity is increasingly being employed 
as a theoretical tool to explain the fragmentation 
of labour in the country. 
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Class and 
Precarity in China: 
A Contested 
Relationship
Heavily-loaded Chinese migrant worker 
starts the journey home for Chinese New 
Year. Photo: @dcmaster, Flickr.
enjoyed by labour for a relatively short period 
of time (from the 1950s to the 1970s) and only 
in advanced economies. In fact, the category 
of precariat is extremely diverse, including 
students, temporary and contract workers, 
elderly workers, migrant and immigrant 
workforces, as well as workers with very 
different skill and educational levels. Thus, 
members of the precariat are defined by 
their lack of secure contracts. The thesis 
stresses divisions between the two groups, or 
empirical examples of collaborations between 
workers on different contracts. Standing 
provides no empirical evidence that people in 
insecure employment identified themselves 
as part of a separate class. This hints at the 
fact that ‘precariat’ is an academic term 
with little traction in people’s lives and self-
identification in class terms.
The employment situation in China follows 
some of these generic trends, but also has 
distinctive characteristics that allow close 
examination of the claim that the precariat 
is a separate new class. In 2014, China had 
772.5 million employed persons, 274 million 
of whom were rural ‘migrant workers’ 
(nongmingong). These migrants are excluded 
from many basic social benefits because of the 
country’s restrictive household registration 
system (hukou), which is used by employers 
to segment workers by different contracts, 
even though they generally perform similar 
types of work. 
In the case of China, we find that there 
is a contradictory movement with regard 
to regular and insecure work. On the one 
hand, legislation has increased security for 
regular workers in mass production and 
mass service industries, where more regular 
forms of employment have been recognised 
and protected by law. On the other, the very 
same legislation has also created incentives 
for employers to use agency or dispatched 
workers and bring in non-regular workers. 
Additionally, many self-employed rural 
migrants are involved in the informal sector, 
or are employed in the formal sector but 
appear to have informal working conditions. 
Increasingly, urbanised migrant workers 
continue to be denied equal citizenship 
and welfare rights, and hold rural hukou 
in perpetuity. The hukou system ‘makes’ 
workers, but not stable urban working class 
communities. Proletarianisation is separated 
from urbanisation, and working class 
community development, which is a typical 
process in most modernisation projects, is 
highly fractured in China. 
Student Interns, Agency 
Workers, and Formal 
Workers
In a recent attempt to apply the precariat 
concept to China, Chunsen Yu offers a more 
detailed empirical assessment of the value of 
the idea. While we are critical of some of his 
argument, what his work shows is that the 
boundary between regular and non-regular 
work is often crossed. Against a static view of 
classes of employee, the China case is dynamic 
and the inflexible concept of the precariat 
singularly unhelpful. In particular, Yu focuses 
on the objective conditions of insecurity of 
rural migrants and uses three indicators of 
precariat status—non-signing of long-term 
labour contracts, irregular payments of 
wages, and non-provision of social security. 
These conditions are looked at through three 
elements of ‘precariat migrant worker class’—
student interns, agency workers, and regular 
workers, which are explored in an empirical 
study of these workers in seven multinational 
companies operating in two regions of China: 
the Liangjiang New Area in Chongqing, and 
the Longhua and Futian districts in Shenzhen. 
In Chongqing the local government 
promoted ‘school–enterprise cooperation’ but 
according to Yu’s findings—which contradict 
official data that says formal workers are the 
majority of employees—60 percent of the 
assembly line workers he interviewed were 
student interns. Reinforcing the findings 
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of others, student interns in his sample 
performed unskilled regular work that bore no 
relation to their studies. They also worked for 
less pay, facing the double burden of factory 
work and school supervision. Yu documents 
that student interns in Chongqing had no 
choice but to comply with their schools’ 
internship arrangements with hi-tech 
factories and other types of manufacturing 
factories.’
Categorising students as part of the precariat 
because of their insecure employment means 
ignoring the major element of their status, i.e. 
the fact that they are undergoing vocational 
training and hence work only for the short-
term. Although they often do not receive 
specialist training in their chosen field, 
this does not change the fact that they are 
structurally temporary workers who plan 
to pursue their career elsewhere. This is a 
constrained, transitional labour force. Yu 
bemoans their lack of commitment to work 
and the struggle by this section of the so-
called precariat, but this is largely due to the 
abuse of the internship system by colleges 
and employers, and it is hardly surprising to 
find members of this group wishing to leave 
employment that does not match their area of 
study or their career aspirations. 
Due to this mismatch, student interns show 
a high level of dissatisfaction with factories, 
and are disengaged with both labour processes 
and collective action. Yu’s research reveals 
that the majority of his student interns were 
confused about their identities, as they saw 
themselves as students, not full-time workers. 
At the same time, though, they were engaged 
in hi-tech factories and treated as full-time 
workers doing assembly line work.
Agency workers face a different set of 
problems. Working through an agency sets 
up a triangular relationship between workers 
and employers. This can add complexity to 
these relations, as well as fraud, as bogus 
employment agencies can easily dupe young 
migrants, taking fees without providing 
work. Problems can also arise in the event 
of a labour controversy, as employers and 
agencies dispute responsibility for health 
and safety failings. In Yu’s research, some 
companies used a limited number of agencies, 
generally just the larger ones, while others 
had a more diverse approach, hiring workers 
through several commercial labour agencies. 
Some companies maintained that they offered 
a temporary-to-permanent pattern of work, 
with workers having the opportunity to 
become formal workers after a probationary 
period, but when Yu spoke to agency workers, 
they disputed this easy transition. Instead, for 
them an ‘agency labour regime’ meant little 
control over work allocation and schedules, 
as well as regular reassignments to different 
types of jobs and easy dismissal. 
Still, this and other accounts that stress 
the negative effects of agencies in forming 
barriers to secure work ignore the fact that 
workers possess labour mobility power and 
they can change agencies if things don’t 
turn out well. Given the large number of 
agencies in China, there is fierce competition 
between them for labour, a situation that 
creates bargaining power for workers. While 
agencies may try to avoid recruiting workers 
who change jobs frequently, the high levels of 
turnover mean this rule is difficult to apply. 
Finally, regarding formal workers, while 
they have regular employment, they also 
face specific problems. For instance, they 
are forced to change their jobs frequently, 
due to factors that include variations in 
production seasons; the practice of loaning 
employees (zhiyuan) to other departments or 
factories; the tradition of changing workers’ 
job specifications and labour relationships 
(fenliu); as well as an abusive labour regime 
that involves the use of ‘constructive 
dismissal’, active pressure to take on 
unwanted tasks, and limited job security. 
Posted workers often lose out financially. 
For example, enrolment at Foxconn was 
effectively compulsory, with formal workers 
being punished with reduced overtime if they 
did not participate. According to Yu, factories 
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routinely violate labour contracts to change 
formal workers’ work, content, and locations, 
effectively ‘selling’ labourers from the 
original factories to other factories or firms.
Problems with the 
Precariat in China
The idea central to the precariat thesis, 
that there is a class divide in terms of the 
employment conditions of the salariat and 
precariat, falls at the first hurdle. All workers 
are insecure in China, and precariousness is 
not evidence of a separate class, but part of 
the general condition of waged labour in the 
country. Take the issue of high labour turnover, 
seen as indicative of precarity. In fact, labour 
turnover is high for all groups and in part 
expresses the mobility power of labour—
and, as such, it has been a central mechanism 
for improving wages and conditions. Jobs 
were more precarious in the 1980s and 
the 1990s than in the new millennium 
when precariousness acquired structural 
significance. More recent protection, if not 
standardisation of employment relations, 
due to state labour policy and legislation, 
has coincided with more labour resistance 
and collective actions. More importantly, 
precarity has been the fate of two generations 
of migrant workers, but in terms of labour 
disputes and collective actions, we witness 
much more in the new or second generation, 
as indicated by numerous empirical studies. 
For instance, Pringle notes that in the 2010 
dispute at a Honda transmissions factory in 
Foshan, agency workers were a critical part 
of the action. 
The official categorisation of peasant 
workers—wage labourers with rural 
household registration—keeps their social 
status and class identities ambiguous. Taking 
a specific path of proletarianisation, the new 
generation of migrant workers has gradually 
become aware of their class position and 
participated in a series of collective actions. 
The migrant workers are now experiencing 
a deeper sense of anger and dissatisfaction 
than that of the first generation, accompanied 
by the realisation that the return to their 
hometowns is more problematic.
To conclude, precariousness as a process 
is a useful concept, ‘precariat’ is not. At 
different times, precariousness is a more or 
less important attribute of being a worker. 
The idea that security is fixed and settled 
is unhelpful as is the idea of a new class 
called the ‘precariat’. The processes of 
creating non-standard forms of employment 
are recognisable across work with different 
forms of status, from unskilled to more 
white collar and professional occupations. 
More importantly, we need to look at 
interactions between workers on different 
contracts in production relations, and not 
invent employment differences that confuse 
employment status and social class. Class is 
about ownership relations, and structural 
class relations between labour and capital.
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China’s manufacturing model has been built 
on the exploitation of migrant workers under 
a despotic labour regime. But is that still the 
case? Based on extensive research in the Chinese 
garment sector, this essay argues that while 
draconian controls persist up to this day, the 
situation of China’s migrants has undergone 
dramatic transformations that encompass 
not only changes in the workers’ demographic 
profile and everyday life practices, but also 
new social, technical, and gendered divisions of 
labour inside factories.
From Dormitory 
System to 
Conciliatory 
Despotism: 
Changing Labour 
Regimes in Chinese 
Factories
For the past three decades, China’s export-
led manufacturing model has been built 
on extensive exploitation of its migrant 
workforce under a despotic labour regime. 
Draconian controls persist, and it is easy 
to view both Chinese migrant workers and 
the ways employers subordinate them as 
static and unchanging. Yet the situation of 
China’s migrants has undergone a dramatic 
transformation—a shift that encompasses not 
only changes in their demographic profile and 
everyday life practices, but also new social, 
technical, and gendered divisions of labour 
inside factories. 
This transformation presents a formidable 
challenge for any conceptual understanding 
of how factory regimes and management 
controls have changed under global capitalism. 
How do managers exert control in Chinese 
factories? What are the characteristics of 
China’s current labour regime? To examine 
these changes, in 2010, I lived with several 
young male migrant workers for six months 
in a small apartment near a garment factory 
in the Pearl River Delta (PRD). 
Focussing on labour-intensive, foreign-
owned factories where tens of millions of 
migrant workers have worked since the 
early 1990s, in this essay I trace the changes 
embodied by reform policies and practiced 
by managers and workers. My findings reveal 
that since the mid-2000s new modes of 
domination—crystallised into a new labour 
regime that I call ‘conciliatory despotism’—
have combined coercive power with new 
workplace tactics and production strategies.
Continuity and the 
Developmental Trajectory 
of Post-Socialist Chinese 
Labour Regimes
While extant studies have noted how the 
emphases of labour regimes shift in line with 
changing patterns in the capitalist economy 
This article draws substantially on the author’s 
forthcoming article ‘Labor and Domination: Worker 
Control in a Chinese Factory,’ in Politics & Society, 
DOI: 10.1177/0032329217714784.
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and society, the emerging Chinese labour 
regime of ‘conciliatory despotism’ has had a 
unique developmental trajectory. On the one 
hand, it incorporates new measures of control 
that allow factory managements to adapt to 
changing global production environments 
and to a domestic economy marred by labour 
shortages. On the other, it inherits a series 
of despotic disciplinary measures that were 
developed during the first exploitative 
wave of capitalist manufacturing in China 
during the 1990s, when foreign companies 
took advantage of the vulnerability of rural 
migrants under an apartheid-like urban 
household registration system that was itself 
a legacy of the Maoist period.     
My research highlights the coexistence of 
institutional continuity and a change in the 
labour-intensive factories of post-socialist 
China. While the Chinese state still engages 
in labour law non-enforcement and employers 
still rely on strong disciplinary measures to 
reinforce their managerial practices, in the 
past few years the Chinese state has relaxed 
the major institution that determined migrant 
workers’ lives in urban areas in the 1990s: 
the discriminatory, restrictive household 
registration system (hukou). At the same 
time, real wages have risen substantially 
and, consequently, workers are no longer 
financially desperate and vulnerable. For 
instance, in response to workers’ capacity 
to afford to live outside factory dormitories, 
away from the constant control of their 
employer, local residents have constructed 
apartment buildings that enable migrant 
workers to find alternative accommodation 
outside factory compounds. Labour shortages 
have also compelled employers to recruit 
more young male migrants, resulting in new 
gendered divisions of labour and workplace 
politics on the shop floor. As a result of these 
new changes, managers and policy-makers 
have had to devise new mechanisms of ‘soft 
control’ to conciliate workers’ grievances. 
Beyond the Dormitory 
Labour Regime
A great deal of China’s export industry 
is clustered in Guangdong province. Until 
recently, the Chinese authorities tightly 
implemented the hukou system to control 
the mobility of migrant workers in much the 
same way as the South African government 
used the pass system in the days of apartheid. 
By restricting peasants to the countryside, 
the state could control not only urban growth 
but also the status and identity of individuals. 
Without an urban registration, rural 
migrants needed a permit to remain away 
from home, and they could only secure 
this if they had an employer. Police in the 
Pearl River Delta (PRD) regularly checked 
their permits on the streets, a situation 
that not only intensified migrants’ fear of 
unemployment but also pushed them to 
get factory jobs at any condition in order 
to become registered ‘workers’ and remain 
in the region. Taking advantage of this 
situation, factory management drew up shop 
floor and dormitory rules alongside physical 
punishments to discipline and penalise 
migrant workers in order to transform them 
into docile and disciplined subjects. 
Outside factories, in the public sphere, 
the state wielded the power to control the 
inflow of migrant workers; inside, managers 
held sway over their lives. Workers from 
the countryside were normally required by 
their employers to reside inside the factory 
grounds, in crowded dormitories that often 
accommodated eight people in a single room. 
Factory dormitories and production lines were 
interlinked, in what Chris Smith and Pun Ngai 
have defined the ‘dormitory labour regime’. 
The dormitory was an extension of the point 
of production, and factory management could 
flexibly utilise and prolong work hours, thus 
maintaining a great breadth of control over 
the working and non-working time of the 
employees. 
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But this despotic dormitory factory regime 
no longer prevails today, as employers have 
lost their monopoly over the housing of the 
workers. In the early 2000s, local villagers in 
the PRD began to demolish their old houses 
to construct cheap, ugly apartment buildings. 
They did so in order to profitably rent out 
rooms to migrants who did not want to live 
in factory dormitories. Still, if workers were 
finally able to escape the dormitories, this 
was only because of major changes in their 
own standing vis-à-vis management.
Labour Famine and Worker 
Empowerment
A fundamental change that occurred is 
that today migrant workers are no longer 
desperate to keep their jobs. As the factories 
in China relentlessly expanded in number 
and size year after year, the stream of young 
rural migrants no longer exceeds the ever-
growing need for workers. Since 2003, 
factory jobs have been readily available, 
and employers have been competing to find 
workers. Facing labour shortages, local 
governments in industrialised districts no 
longer seek to control the movements of the 
workers. Migrant workers today do not need 
to obtain work permits to stay in the PRD 
region, though they still are supposed to 
obtain temporary residence permits, which 
are seldom checked in the streets.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, for most types 
of production work, factory managers were 
willing to employ only young women between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-three, on 
the ground that they have nimbler hands, 
are more obedient, and easier to manage. 
The factories were not interested in older 
rural women in the belief that by the age of 
twenty-four most of them would return to 
their home village to get married and have a 
child. But the number of young rural women 
in China was not limitless, and as the number 
of factories kept expanding, labour shortages 
of young women became evident. For this 
reason, since around 2003, employers could 
no longer allow themselves to be too choosy 
and had to start employing women in their 
early thirties, as well as young men. 
The competition to recruit workers has had 
at least one other effect: over the past twelve 
years, the real wages of migrant workers 
have more than tripled in Shenzhen, China’s 
leading centre for the export industry. By the 
late 2000s, migrant workers in the southern 
metropolis could afford to regularly eat 
meals with vegetables and meat, to snack 
regularly at fast-food outlets, and to eat 
sometimes at small cheap restaurants; they 
could afford smartphones; could afford to 
dress attractively—and could afford to talk 
back or quit work if harassed. This needs to 
be put into context, though. They were still 
very poor, and by urban Chinese standards 
their hourly wages were considered quite 
low. Moreover, urban residents still refused 
to engage in blue-collar work in factories 
where migrants worked. In their shared 
rental apartments, double-decker beds were 
crowded together. When I lived with a group 
of male migrants, my housemates decided to 
save even more money by sharing the same 
mattress with another worker, each sleeping 
in shifts. 
Towards Conciliatory 
Despotism
My study of a garment factory in the PRD 
reveals that all control mechanisms are 
embedded in a wide array of factory rules, 
regulations, practices, customs, production 
hierarchies, divisions of labour, and systems 
of production. Each of these modes of 
domination assumes different forms, with 
mechanisms ranging from despotic to the 
tactical and strategic. Coercive power 
includes punishment, disciplinary measures, 
and restrictive resignation and leave policies. 
Workplace tactics and strategies include 
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affective personal ties and face-giving, 
(collective) bargaining, and encouragement 
of competition among workers. Over time, 
social, technical, and gendered divisions of 
labour and the production hierarchy have 
been altered.
The use of punishment and disciplinary 
tools, affective personal ties, face-giving 
tactics, hidden collective bargaining, and 
competition among workers jointly determine 
the extent to which workers are dominated. 
The ways these mechanisms combine and 
the extent to which each of them has been 
brought into play has changed over the past 
decade. Extracting extra work time is one of 
the major aims of the despotic apparatuses, 
and exploitation is evident to workers 
who are forced, for instance, to do unpaid 
overtime. In a changing labour environment, 
though, a new shop-floor culture comprising 
of new strategies to control workers’ 
emotions, dispositions, and rationalities, 
seemingly speaks against the literature in 
Chinese labour studies from an earlier decade 
which emphasised the blatant coercion of a 
despotic labour regime.
How does all this change our understanding 
of contemporary Chinese practices? My 
research has shown that despotic controls 
alone are no longer able to maintain factory 
order, and that a new regime of ‘conciliatory 
despotism’ has been taking shape to 
replace the older dormitory labour regime. 
‘Conciliatory’ refers to the incorporation of 
new mechanisms of soft control in normative 
forms of shop-floor tactics and production 
strategies, aimed at creating a shop-floor 
culture which mediates direct confrontations, 
gives workers a sense of give-and-take over 
the production process, and boosts individual 
productivity through competition. 
Of particular importance to this conciliatory 
approach is the fact that line leaders and 
supervisors have to invest in affective ties 
with rank-and-file workers, and to devise 
effective interactive tactics whenever there 
are emotional outbursts. Different from 
the situation in the 1990s when despotism 
prevailed and management had no interest 
in appeasing workers, these affective ties—
though thin, fragile, and still based mostly 
upon cold market relations and coercive 
power—are part of a new stage of development 
in China’s labour-management relations. 
Such ties are strategically activated by low-
level members of management to mediate 
workers’ discontents in a context where 
coercive power alone is not effective enough 
to control employees. 
Workers today can readily find jobs 
elsewhere and thus are able to respond to 
excessive coercion by leaving the factory. 
Thus, low-level managers, in dealing 
with emotional outbursts, invoke Chinese 
cultural norms through face-giving tactics to 
maintain factory order. Giving workers ‘face’ 
entails temporarily considering workers 
not as subordinate tools for production, but 
as human beings to be respected (at least 
nominally). Unlike the situation in the 1990s, 
where management in Chinese factories 
considered rural migrants to be ‘uncivilised’ 
subjects in need of disciplining by modern 
factory rules and practices, the unequal power 
relationship between managers and migrants 
is slowly shifting towards a more ‘humanised’ 
social bond through which both rank-and-
file workers and low-level management are 
increasingly able to influence the outcomes 
of the labour process in China. 
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Dorothy J. Solinger
When discussing the outcomes of China’s 
economic development, the poverty that can still 
be found in Chinese cities is seldom mentioned. 
While the Party-state is indeed making a token 
effort to sustain the victims of this destitution, 
these people and their offspring will never be 
able to escape this manufactured poverty. This 
essay looks at the policy process that led to 
this outcome and at the prospects for poverty 
alleviation in Chinese urban areas.  
The Precarity of 
Layoffs and State 
Compensation: 
The Minimum Livelihood 
Guarantee  
When discussing the results of China’s 
‘miracle’ development over the past four 
decades, it is common enough to hear about 
the large numbers of rural Chinese citizens—
especially those residing in designated 
poor counties—who have been ‘lifted out of 
poverty’ by the policies of the government, 
or about the surging numbers of the ‘new 
middle class’, or else, often enough, about 
the infamous urban-rural income divide—
which suggests that all those in urban areas 
are well off if they have the good fortune to 
hold an urban household registration. But, by 
contrast, we hear almost nothing about the 
poverty and attendant precarity found in the 
cities, which the state itself has engendered. 
The state makes a token effort to sustain the 
victims of this destitution, but it is clear they 
will never be able to escape this manufactured 
poverty, nor will their offspring. How many of 
them are there and how did this transpire?
‘State of Surrender’, Yunnan. Photo: @mimokhair on Flickr
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Manufacturing Precarity in 
the State Sector
It is easier to document the regime choices 
and the process that produced this outcome, 
and to describe the programme intended 
to maintain the status quo, than to estimate 
the number of people affected. But tens of 
millions would be a fair guess. The choices 
of the Chinese leadership had much to do 
with China’s aim for a type of modernity 
characterised by participation in global 
competition, spurred on by the country’s 
preparation to enter the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in the late 1990s. The lot 
of China’s laid-off workers, therefore, rightly 
fits within the rubric of the types of precarity 
attending the life of labourers around 
the world. This shift towards integration 
into the global economy overlapped with 
an official diagnosis of the failure of the 
planned economy and of its unsuitability for 
participation in the modern world market, 
which was ultimately responsible for driving 
huge numbers of state-owned firms into the 
red by the mid-1990s.
As a consequence of those glances both 
ahead and into the past, on the eve of China’s 
accession to the WTO the decision makers at 
the helm of the state determined that firms 
losing money were not just a significant drain 
on the state budget, but also—and perhaps 
even more critically—incapable of competing 
in the world market, due to their unskilled 
workforces and obsolete technology. For 
this reason, they had to be shut down, with 
their workers dismissed from their jobs in 
droves. Figures vary, but in recent years most 
observers agree that the total of those let go 
may well have exceeded sixty million.  
So a project termed ‘enterprise restructuring’ 
(qiye gaizhi) was set into motion from 1997 to 
1999, following the principle of ‘grasping the 
big and letting go the small’ (zhuada fangxiao). 
This amounted to allowing the smaller firms, 
and those in non-strategic sectors, to fail; it 
also meant permitting the more successful 
enterprises to take over anything of value 
from the weaker ones—primarily by way of 
mergers or buyouts. Complex arrangements 
sometimes ensued, but the upshot for my 
argument here is to highlight the emergence 
of mass unemployment for many millions of 
older—that is over the age of thirty-five!—
state workers, whose education was deficient 
because of the closure of schools during the 
Cultural Revolution. Deemed worthless, 
these people were often forced to make do 
on their own. Certainly, a huge increase in 
urban poverty occurred at that time, affecting 
perhaps some 15 to 20 percent of the urban 
population if dependents of the laid-off 
workers are included, and nothing serious 
has been done to remove this blight.
A hastily assembled plan called the ‘Re-
employment Project’ (zaijiuye gongcheng) 
was put into action in 1998. It was supposed 
to be underwritten by enterprises, localities, 
and ‘society’, with the aim of supplying 
training, finding jobs, and distributing ‘basic 
livelihood allowances’ (jiben shenghuofei) for 
the furloughed. But in fact, many workers 
received no funds, and even for those who 
did, the amount they were given was grossly 
inadequate. Moreover, indebted or bankrupt 
firms were not able to contribute to the 
collections, and the rate of re-employment 
even after a few years fell below 20 percent.
Minimum Livelihood 
Allowance as a Tranquiliser
Workers responded by protesting 
vociferously in many cities, disrupting traffic, 
business, and local administrations. Central 
leaders understandably became anxious, first 
about the instability itself, and then about 
what they deemed to be the likely impact on 
their visions of enterprise ‘reform’, and what 
such disorder might spell for discouraging 
foreign investment. The judgment of the 
political elites was that a ‘tranquiliser’, in 
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the form of a ‘minimum livelihood allowance’ 
(zuidi shenghuo baozhang, or dibao), was to be 
provided to all urban citizens whose families’ 
average household income fell below a 
locally set poverty line. Thus, the leadership 
expanded a scheme pioneered in Shanghai 
in 1993, decreeing that it was to be adopted 
in every city by the fall of 1999. The sums 
dispensed were trivial, whether considered 
as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP), or as compared with average levels of 
disposable income in the various localities.
The programme is means-tested, meagre, 
and stigmatising. It entails cash transfers, 
requiring no contributions, but it also sets no 
conditions, such as demanding that mothers 
ensure that their children see doctors and go 
to school (as is the case for other social relief 
plans elsewhere in the world). Thus, it seems 
indifferent as to whether it lays out a path to 
eventual, inter-generational departure from 
penury.
As of the mid-2000s, soon after the birth of 
the programme, about 4 percent of the urban 
populace was being served, a percentage 
that remains pretty much the same today 
nationally. But at that time independent 
investigators figured that something like 
twice that percentage of the people had net 
incomes below the poverty line in their own 
cities. More than that, yesterday as today, a 
frequently bemoaned ‘preference for friends 
and relatives’ has placed the allotments into 
hands that do not deserve it, overlooking 
often enough those who do need assistance.  
In addition, as the years passed, by the end 
of the decade able-bodied unemployed people 
were advised to find work for themselves, 
even as the labour market was decidedly 
unfriendly to these ‘aged’, under-educated, 
and sometimes disabled or ill former workers. 
Many of them were unable to leave their 
homes, as they had no choice but to tend to 
their own sick, infirm, and young, since their 
scant incomes prohibited them from hiring 
any help.
Perspectives from the 
Beneficiaries
How do the recipients of this assistance 
experience their situation? The following 
excerpt reveals how they struggle to get 
along. When asked what they would like to 
see the government do for them, here is what 
a recipient said:
Recipient: First, supply some regular 
jobs; second, when you do a little business, 
shouldn’t the government’s policy tilt to you? 
If the government doesn’t help, we certainly 
don’t have the strength to assist ourselves. 
Interviewer: To help the recipients of dibao 
throw off poverty, are jobs the root cure?
Recipient: Yes. Otherwise, just give more 
money, but it’s not possible, giving us one 
third of the average wage is not possible. If 
the state’s finance really has this ability, why 
can’t it adjust employment policy? I feel that 
at the present stage the state should raise 
[our allowance] a little, price inflation now 
is so severe! The prices of so many things 
have risen, how can this be tolerated? The 
recipients of dibao are already very low on 
money, you could give them a little more. 
Public officials and government cadres don’t 
care about inflation, if you give them two 
hundred yuan [at the time of the interview, 
that would have been about twenty-five 
USD], or five hundred yuan, it won’t count 
for much. But for the recipients of dibao, if 
you give them ten yuan or twenty yuan it has 
a function. But the state can’t simply give you 
more money, so I say it’s employment. Really 
getting rid of the dibao would be good. Having 
some stable work instead, wouldn’t that be 
even better?
The programme often comes under 
suspicion because people assume that it 
enables laziness and a reluctance to work. 
And yet other interview subjects agreed 
with the sentiments of the interviewee 
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quoted above. In 2010, a beneficiary of the 
programme in Guangzhou—a man who was 
half-paralysed and had both high blood 
pressure and diabetes—still wished to work. 
In his words: ‘Because I’m too old and sick, 
if you were a boss you wouldn’t look for a 
forty-year-old sick person, it’s this simple.’ 
Similarly, another recipient in the same city 
at the same time declared that: ‘Everything 
requires a high educational background, but 
I only have primary school education, so 
naturally they won’t hire me. Talented people 
are numerous; they won’t take me. You say go 
to sell things, but that needs start-up money 
(benqian). Private businesspeople won’t hire 
us, and private bosses have no reason to ask a 
sick, old person to work, right?’ 
A Cultural Explanation
Once laid off from enterprises, older 
workers are seen as of no use. So it is felt that 
it is best to keep them barely alive, but not 
as a part of society. It is better to leave them 
unemployed and stuck in their homes, out of 
sight. Do not waste resources, let them die off, 
is the implicit message. So let’s view the laid-
off, sick, and older urban people as metaphors 
for Mao’s society. It seems that those people, 
along with that society, should be obliterated. 
The market is modern, and it cannot absorb 
them. Modern is middle class—a state that is 
impossible to reach for these laid-off workers 
and their children.
And there has been no real effort to help 
them break out of their impoverishment, as 
an inter-generational cycle of poverty gears 
into motion. True, Party leader Xi Jinping 
promises an end to poverty in the near 
future, but it is only rural poverty to which 
he alludes, which, as noted above, can be 
addressed by targeting funds and services 
to whole areas of the countryside. There 
has been almost no mention of the urban 
poor. Thus, while the future of China can be 
viewed as a beautiful dream, the past remains 
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depicted as a nightmare, filled with poverty, 
backwardness, and obsolescence. The poor 
are the antithesis of the dream, of the market, 
of economic growth, of progress, and glory. 
When multitudes of the old ‘masters’ of 
society (as state workers were labelled in 
the past) raged in the roads, the dibao was 
established to calm them down. But a policy 
devised mainly for stability waned as the 
beneficiaries went back home, out of sight. So 
as the project achieved its political purpose, 
its funds have diminished, relatively speaking. 
This is a tale of poverty and of precarity that 
never gets told. 
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Edwin Schmitt
The recent Party Congress has seen an 
outpouring of support for strengthening 
environmental protections. This has come amid 
an intensified environmental crackdown that 
has seen surprise inspections of mostly smaller 
and older factories across the country. While 
these activities have received some attention in 
the Chinese media, at present very few reports 
can be found in English. To fill this gap, this 
essay explores the implications of the campaign 
for workers and business in Chengdu.
How China’s 
Environmental 
Crackdown Is 
Affecting Business 
Owners and 
Workers: The Case of 
Chengdu
The Nineteenth Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) has seen an outpouring 
of support for strengthening environmental 
protections—a theme which was central to Xi 
Jinping’s opening speech. This event comes 
amid an intensified environmental crackdown 
across the country. Beginning in late July, 
drawing on the vivid metaphor of ‘cutting 
with a single knife’ (yi dao qie), the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP) began a 
1st Round: 12 July–19 August 2016; 
2nd Round: 24 November–30 December 2016; 
3rd Round: 24 April–28 May 2017; 
4th Round: 7 August–10 September 2017.
Map of China’s Central Environmental 
Inspections.
44 MADE IN CHINA - FOCUS
surprise round of environmental inspections 
of factories in the Jing-Jin-Ji region, the area 
that encompasses Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei 
province. The focus was primarily on smaller 
and older factories, which are recurring 
violators of environmental regulations. 
These inspections quickly expanded to all 
the provinces, with the MEP publishing 
notices in the People’s Daily explaining that 
this protracted period of strict observation 
will become the ‘new normal’. While these 
activities have received some attention in the 
Chinese media, at present very few reports 
can be found in English. In this essay we focus 
on the implications of this latest campaign 
in Chengdu. However, it is clear that this is 
a nationwide shift in policy implementation 
with implications for all of Chinese society. 
A Play in Four Acts
While the past three months have seen 
the implementation of stricter controls, a 
four-stage series of routine environmental 
investigations began in July 2016. The real 
crackdown began during the third-stage, 
with an especially damning report of Tianjin 
officials on 29 July 2017. The critique of the 
typically powerful Tianjin officials resulted 
in an unprecedented number of follow-up 
environmental inspections orchestrated by 
local Environmental Protection Bureaus 
across the country. As a consequence, 
an increased number of factory closures 
occurred in provinces that had been visited 
by the central inspection teams over the 
previous months. These recent closures have 
already begun to impact China’s export 
business. On 13 September, while one of us 
was interviewing a logistics manager for a 
vehicle manufacturer in the United States, 
the manager asked us for information about 
the recent factory closures in China. He had 
received multiple emails from suppliers in 
China explaining that deliveries would be 
delayed and prices would be increased due to 
the environmental inspections. Additionally, 
suppliers in China informed the manager 
that these price hikes would be permanent, 
as the environmental policies now in place 
were intended to be enforced indefinitely. 
Similar reports have been published on cargo 
shipping blogs. Bloomberg has also recently 
noted that with thousands of factories 
suddenly closing there will be major logistical 
disruptions as the peak consumerist period in 
the US and Europe arrives before Christmas. 
However, as of yet very little information 
about what is actually happening on the 
ground in China has been reported.
Since we have both conducted research in 
Chengdu, we will draw from recent concrete 
examples found in that city. As we will show 
below, some factories were closed even before 
the completion of the fourth and final stage of 
the central environmental inspections, which 
began on 7 August 2017 and included Sichuan, 
with a heavy focus on Chengdu. The local 
authorities issued an urgent call for all 
government agencies to collaborate with the 
inspectors, but insisted that factories were 
not to be shut down without proof that the 
law had been broken. Any violators were to 
be fined heavily and potentially forced to 
close. In total, the inspection team ended 
up disciplining 1,023 officials. According to 
one of our informants within the Sichuan 
Environmental Protection Bureau, there is a 
great deal of fatigue within the various local 
environmental protection agencies. This is 
due to the fact that these offices are forced to 
continually implement follow-up inspections 
with the same number of people and same 
limited resources that they had before the 
central inspection teams arrived. Regardless 
of this, as of the time of writing, the local 
inspections continue with no apparent end in 
sight. 
Naturally, the business community has 
greeted this pressure with mixed feelings. 
This was evident in the circulation of many 
fake news reports of damages to China’s 
economy due to the delays and price 
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increases caused by the inspection teams. 
One informant who spread such information 
admitted the inspections had no impact on 
their own business, but simply felt it was 
important to support other business owners 
in China by reposting calls for the removal of 
the strict policies. There have also been false 
reports that the MEP reversed these policies 
in response to the outcry from business 
owners. One report misconstrued the purpose 
of an MEP press conference to claim that 
the central authorities had never required 
local governments to use a ‘cutting with a 
single knife’ style in the implementation of 
the new policies and that factories could 
now return to normal operation. In fact, the 
conference made no mention of allowing 
factories to restart operations, but stressed 
that the crackdown would not tolerate the 
closure of entire economic sectors without 
proper evidence. As mentioned above, from 
the very beginning the provincial authorities 
in Sichuan province issued a warning to 
inspectors not to close factories without 
proof of a law violation. When the business 
community started complaining about 
‘unfair’ practices during the inspections, 
China Environmental News sent a reporter 
to provide in-depth coverage of the impact 
of the policies on different industries. The 
reporter claimed that not all factories or 
businesses of a given industry or service were 
being closed, but rather that environmental 
bureaus in Chengdu were specifically going 
after those companies that were in violation 
of the law. However, none of this reporting 
has paid any attention to the impact of 
the crackdown on the workers within the 
factories or businesses that have been closed.
Evidence from the 
Footwear Industry
To gain a better understanding of the 
impact these environmental inspections 
have had on local businesses and workers, 
we will now take a closer look at Chengdu’s 
footwear industry. The local footwear sector 
experienced a period of successful economic 
development in the first decade of the 2000s. 
Industrial relocation from China’s coastal 
provinces and a large, relatively cheap, skilled 
workforce have enabled Chengdu—together 
with Chongqing—to become the fourth largest 
footwear production base in China, behind 
the traditional and primary production 
centres in Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian 
provinces. Footwear companies in Chengdu 
focus on the production of medium to low-end 
quality women’s leather shoes. In particular, 
the industry cluster in Wuhou district has 
been officially labelled ‘China’s Capital of 
Women’s Shoes’ (zhongguo nüxie zhi du). The 
structure of the industry—consisting mainly 
of small and medium enterprises, and many 
unregulated or unregistered workshops—as 
well as its proximity to the city centre, has 
unsurprisingly made this footwear cluster a 
major target for environmental inspections. 
According to official media reports, by 
30 June 2017, 7,600 ‘scattered, polluting 
enterprises’ (sanluanwu qiye) in Chengdu 
had been ‘temporarily’ closed because of 
environmental inspections. By the end of 
October 2017, this number should reach a total 
of 9,400 firms. While we do not have access to 
independently verifiable figures with regards 
to the footwear industry, several online 
accounts point to a massive wave of closures. 
By mid-August, more than 90 percent of 
the estimated 3,000 footwear companies in 
Chengdu’s Wuhou and Shuangliu districts 
had been ordered to halt production. In 
addition, the few remaining firms that 
had been allowed to stay in business were 
confronted with difficulties in doing so, as 
most of their supplier factories were also 
affected by production stoppages.
It is important to note that ‘temporary’ 
closures of footwear firms are in line with 
environmental policy, but also with broader 
urban planning objectives and local industrial 
development strategies. Since 2007, with the 
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adoption of the so-called ‘one capital, two 
parks’ (yi du liang yuan) guideline, it has been 
official policy to focus on the establishment of 
an R&D base as well as a trade, information, 
and service center for the footwear industry in 
Wuhou District. Manufacturing facilities were 
encouraged to undergo industrial upgrading 
and/or to relocate to footwear industry parks 
in the peri-urban counties of Chongzhou 
and Jintang. This policy of upgrading and 
relocating has since then intensified with 
the establishment of industrial parks in 
rural parts of Sichuan province (for example, 
Anyue, Lezhi, and Santai) and the urban 
planning objective of transforming Wuhou 
District into a development hub for creative 
industries. Seen from this perspective, the 
recent rounds of environmental inspections 
highly increased the pressure on business 
owners who have, thus far, been reluctant 
to either invest in upgrading, or to move 
further away from Chengdu. This pressure 
weighs more heavily now that even the MEP 
has explicitly linked the environmental 
inspections to the broader national objective 
of industrial upgrading. 
Collective Resistance
Confronted with forced production halts, 
business owners have organised themselves 
under the guidance of the so-called ‘Chengdu 
Footwear Business Association’ (chengdu 
xieye tongye gonghui), a platform for local 
footwear producers and suppliers established 
in 1998. The Business Association undertook 
an investigation across the local industry, 
and on 21 August sent a detailed report to 
the municipal authorities urging them to pay 
attention to the extent of the closures, the 
number of workers driven into unemployment, 
and the economic losses generated by the 
environmental inspections. Over the following 
weeks, several meetings between business 
and government representatives took place. 
While acknowledging the unavoidability of 
large-scale relocations out of Wuhou and 
Shuangliu districts, the Business Association 
demanded more time to prepare for the 
relocations and was granted permission 
to resume production in the meantime. 
Arguably, one of the most interesting aspects 
of this collective effort by business owners 
was how they tried to advance their position 
by pointing to the danger of social instability. 
In another report delivered on 21 August, the 
Business Association warned that the current 
situation of tens of thousands of unemployed 
shoe factory workers might lead to ‘mass 
incidents’ (qunti shijian).
In fact, collective protests by workers 
pushed into unemployment due to recent 
environmental inspections have been 
documented in Tianjin, as well as Shandong, 
Hunan, and Hebei provinces. However, 
similar public protests could not be verified 
‘Stand firm! Shoe factories, we are with 
you’. This picture was circulated during the 
environmental crackdown by the footwear 
supplier company and B2B platform Zhao Mi 
Dou, which is operating in Chengdu.
47MADE IN CHINA - FOCUS
in Chengdu’s footwear industry. Since the 
beginning of August, workers in several 
factories where we conducted research 
started to express their anger at the closure of 
their workplaces and the ensuing uncertainty 
they faced. One way of expressing their 
frustration was to share videos of protests by 
unemployed workers elsewhere. They would 
also share unverified accounts and rumours 
about physical clashes between inspection 
teams and workers in the area. The most 
widespread form of articulating dissent on 
social media was to write and share cynical 
comments and poems (See the example above) 
directly criticising central state policy and 
the ‘specialists’ sent to enforce environmental 
protection at the expense of the livelihood of 
the workers. 
Besides expressing their frustration on 
social media, the immediate reaction of many 
shoe factory workers was to go back to their 
rural homes and wait there until work in 
Chengdu could be taken up again. Many are 
rural migrant workers who can easily reach 
their villages within hours. This has been a 
common strategy for local shoe production 
workers in recent years when there is no work 
available due to reduced production orders. 
Towards the end of August, as it became 
clear that most of the small- and medium-
sized factories in Wuhou district would not 
resume production, an increasing number of 
workers began to move on to new footwear 
industrial parks further way from Chengdu. 
Whether these relocation processes succeed 
remains to be seen. Fieldwork conducted 
prior to the environmental crackdown 
suggested that the majority of rural migrant 
workers employed in the footwear industry 
were determined to stay in the urban area, 
while the younger generation (under the age 
of thirty) is particularly reluctant to take up 
these precarious factory jobs. 
It should also be stressed, however, that 
the local government(s) in Chengdu deployed 
a broad range of measures to ease tensions 
and aid unemployed workers. According to 
official media reports, by the first week of 
August, the municipal authorities had already 
organised forty-nine job fairs in the districts 
that were most severely affected by company 
closures and successfully provided 6,000 new 
job opportunities. In addition to job fairs, a 
special government hotline that promised 
to help workers find re-employment within 
forty-eight hours was set up. Finally, every 
company that agreed to employ workers 
affected by the recent closures has been 
promised subsidies of 5,000 yuan per job/
year over a period of three years, with the 
A frequently shared comment found in WeChat groups discussing recent factory closures.
Translation: Thanks to the hard work of the government, in the name of environmental protection, 
chemical plants, plastic factories, brick factories, gravel pits, steel foundries, construction sites, mines, 
lumber yards, and the livestock industry have all been shut down. The price of all kinds of goods have 
increased, sources of goods have dried up, trucks have stopped deliveries, workers have all been laid 
off, even business owners are about to close shop. This year’s air quality in the city and the countryside 
has reached a ‘safe to eat’ level of cleanliness so everyone can relax and ‘drink up’ that Northwest Wind! 
If you like this, share it.
感谢政府的努力，以环保之名，化工厂停了, 塑料厂停了, 砖瓦厂停了，沙石场
停了，铸造厂停了，楼也停了，矿也停了，木板厂也停了，养殖业也停了，各
种货物价也涨了，货源还断了，货车也停了，工人也都停工了，做生意的也快
关门了，今年成立乡里的空气质量达到了可食用级别了，大家可以放心喝西北
风了！被点赞转发下去
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government paying the employer’s share of 
social security contributions for the newly 
employed workforce.
Beyond Formalism
The recent environmental crackdown will 
likely have real, long-term consequences for 
both China’s business owners and workers. 
While it may take some time to know for 
sure, we do not expect that factories will 
be allowed to return to business-as-usual 
once they restart production or move to a 
new peri-urban location. Reports that were 
issued during the central inspections in 
Sichuan show that while Chengdu was the 
initial focus of the crackdown, ultimately the 
whole province was strictly scrutinised. The 
Sichuan Provincial MEP continues to collect 
complaints from the public and strictly 
enforce the law by punishing violators 
with fines and litigation. Moreover, all 
of these activities are continuously being 
updated online with a remarkable degree of 
transparency, including what appear to be full 
formal complaints made to local MEPs across 
the province, along with explanations of how 
the agencies have responded. Against this 
background, available media reports suggest 
that environmental inspections (including 
factory closures) have also taken place in 
the more recently established footwear 
industry parks. This is also referred to by a 
representative of the new industry park in 
Anyue who was quoted in the Sichuan Daily 
as saying: ‘In the admission process [of firms 
intending to relocate to the park], we are also 
demanding that company owners upgrade 
with regard to production and environmental 
protection.’
In other words, this does not appear to 
be an example of local officials engaging 
in ‘formalism’ by requiring factories to 
close while investigators from the central 
government are in town. Instead, the local 
government appears to recognise that 
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environmental closures are tied to larger 
calls for upgrading manufacturing systems 
and reforming economic production. While it 
will undoubtedly not be a perfect transition, 
the state is clearly attempting to pair re-
employment services with strict enforcement 
of environmental regulations. Perhaps this is 
a prelude to the kind of governing strategies 
to expect from both the central and local 
governments now that the Nineteenth 
Congress of the CCP has concluded. In the near 
term, we will all need to pay closer attention 
to this intersection between environmental 
protection and industrial transformation. 
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Henrik Kloppenborg Møller
Since 2014, declining economic growth and Xi 
Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign have led 
to decreasing demand in certain markets for 
jadeite—the highest valued type of jade in China. 
But while institutional factors may explain these 
short-term fluctuations, historical continuity 
and cultural imaginations underpinning 
Chinese demand suggest that the jadeite market 
boom in China is not quite over yet. 
Boom or Bust in 
China’s Jade Trade 
with Myanmar?
A trader sells small pieces of jadeite from Myanmar’s Kachin State in the jade bazaar in Ruili, a border 
town in China’s Yunnan province. Photo: Henrik K. Møller
In November 2015, I was seated at a tea 
table with a group of jade traders in an 
alleyway shop in Shanghai. The traders 
were discussing risks and opportunities of 
different types of investments. This was after 
the crash that saw the Shanghai Composite 
Index (SCI) fall by more than 20 percent for 
two consecutive months from July to August 
2015, causing Chinese investors to lose about 
five trillion euros. The owner of the jade 
shop was convinced that with time his stocks 
would gain value. His daughter, on the other 
hand, had not invested in the stock market, 
because she felt that it was akin to gambling. 
‘It is much safer to invest in jade,’ she said, 
‘Jade will always keep its value.’ 
As an object of economic value, jadeite 
(feicui)—the highest valued type of jade 
in China—seems subject to boom and bust 
cycles in China’s current economy, not unlike 
stocks, real estate, or gold. While jadeite has 
seen spectacular price rises in the past three 
decades, parts of the industry took a blow 
in 2014, which Chinese traders generally 
ascribe to two factors: declining economic 
growth and Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
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campaign. However, institutional factors 
are not sufficient to understand the long-
term trajectories of the markets for jadeite 
in the Chinese context. Jadeite is considered 
a sub-type of jade (yu), which in the form 
of nephrite has been valued in China for at 
least eight thousand years. Over this long 
history, jade has assumed culturally specific 
connotations and properties that make it 
highly desirable for Chinese customers—a 
situation that may suggest that its markets 
are not likely to disappear. 
Jadeite Trade in the China–
Myanmar Borderlands: A 
History
Jadeite has reportedly trickled into China 
from mines in Myanmar’s Kachin State since 
the thirteenth century. Legend has it that 
the material was first imported into China’s 
Yunnan province along one of the ancient 
caravan trade routes that linked Yunnan with 
Myanmar and India. Supposedly, a Yunnanese 
muleteer picked up a stone in Kachin state 
and put it in his saddlebag as a counterweight 
to his cargo. Back in Yunnan, the stone fell to 
the ground and broke into pieces, revealing 
a green interior. But jadeite did not leave a 
strong impression in China until the Qing 
emperor Qianlong (1735–1796)—who was 
obsessed with jade—started to demand large-
scale imports of the stone as tribute from the 
Burmese King Bodawpaya in 1788. Emerald-
green jadeite with high transparency and 
translucency was then called ‘Imperial Jade’ 
(diwang yu). Today these Qing-era criteria 
still function as a standard to evaluate the 
quality of jadeite types. 
In 1860, during the Second Opium War, 
French and British armies sacked the 
Summer Palace in Beijing. On that occasion, 
many jade artefacts—including Burmese 
jadeite—were looted and brought to Paris 
and London. In 1863, French mineralogist A. 
Damour determined the chemical properties 
of this ‘new’ jade, and named it jadeite. 
Jadeite is chemically distinct from the more 
common nephrite jade, which is mined 
especially around Hetian, in China’s Xinjiang 
province, but both materials are considered 
to be jade due to their similar observable 
properties. After the communist takeover 
in 1949, the Myanmar-China cross-border 
trade withered, and the bulk of the jadeite 
trade was diverted to other routes. One 
route went through Myanmar’s Shan State to 
markets in the northern Thai city of Chiang 
Mai, which catered specifically to buyers 
from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Alongside 
local ethnic groups, remnants of Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s nationalist troops in Myanmar’s 
Shan State also transported the stones, 
which were locally taxed by different ethnic 
armies. Another route saw jadeite brought 
to Rangoon, and then shipped to Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. Different Kachin tribes 
have taxed jadeite in the Kachin State for 
centuries. The Kachin Independence Army 
(KIA), which was established in 1961, and has 
since fought the Burmese military for greater 
autonomy for ethnic Kachin in the Kachin 
State, took control of the mines in 1963, and 
centralised taxation.
With the opening of border crossings 
between China and Myanmar for trade in the 
early 1990s, increasing Chinese involvement 
in natural resource extraction in Myanmar, 
and a gradual shift in demand towards 
mainland China, jadeite transport shifted 
towards routes that run overland from the 
Kachin State into China. The main point of 
entry became the border town of Ruili in 
Yunnan province, which since 1990 has seen 
the establishment of a Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) for border trade, as well as upgraded 
infrastructure in the form of highways and a 
projected railway line.
Following a ceasefire agreement between 
the KIA and the Myanmar military in 1994, 
the Myanmar military government gradually 
took over the most profitable jadeite mines in 
Kachin State, and leased mining concessions 
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to their cronies and to Chinese investors. By 
2002, the Myanmar military government had 
offered up to nearly one-fifth of the area of 
Kachin state for private mining concessions, 
and by the mid-2000s, the government 
required all gemstones produced by joint 
ventures to be sold at annual government-
organised auctions in Yangon and later 
Naypyidaw, as this was the easiest way to tax 
all sales. 
Total taxes in Myanmar amount to around 30 
percent of the estimated sales value of a stone, 
and a similar import tax is officially levied at 
the Chinese border in Ruili. In practice, both 
taxes are often lowered or avoided by bribing 
officials, valuators, and border guards, or by 
smuggling the stones across the border—it is 
estimated that up to 80 percent of the stones 
that are brought to China enter the country 
illegally. A report by Global Witness estimated 
that the value of official jade production in 
Myanmar in 2014 was 31 billion USD, a figure 
equal to 48 percent of Myanmar’s official 
gross domestic product and 46 times the 
government expenditure on health for that 
year. The bulk of that jadeite goes to China. 
Meanwhile, the native Kachin people have 
lost crucial revenues from the jadeite mines, 
while facing rampant heroin addiction, HIV 
infection, environmental degradation, and 
dangerous working conditions in the mines. 
In June 2011, the ceasefire between the KIA 
and the central government collapsed, and 
the ensuing violence resulted in the death of 
thousands of people and the displacement of 
around 100,000 civilians in the state. 
Ethnic Stratification in 
Ruili’s Jadeite Trade
In 2013 and 2014, I conducted fieldwork 
among jadeite traders and carvers in Ruili. 
The city’s registered population was 187,000 
as of 2012, comprising Han Chinese (57 
percent), Dai (30 percent) Jingpo (7 percent), 
as well as a host of other minority groups. 
There are also around 35,000 unregistered 
Burmese, including some 15,000 Rohingya in 
Ruili. Around 60 percent of the Han Chinese 
are locals, while the rest are immigrants from 
cities in eastern Chinese provinces with long 
traditions in jade carving and trading—such 
as Henan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu, and 
Guangdong. A local government official I 
interviewed in 2013 estimated that at least 
50,000 people in Ruili are directly involved 
in the formal jadeite trade, a figure that 
does not include freelancers. The city hosts 
six major jadeite markets and around 8,000 
shops. Many traders are organised in jade 
trade associations based on ethnic or regional 
affiliation. 
Thanks to their broader access to investment 
capital and buyers in coastal China, Han 
Chinese control the largest companies. 
Some traders buy jadeite boulders at the 
government-organised auctions in Naypyidaw; 
others purchase stones in Mandalay, which 
are later brought into Ruili by professional 
transporters who take advantage of personal 
connections at government checkpoints. A 
subset of traders have stones smuggled in 
directly from the mines in Kachin state. People 
of Kachin/Jingpo ethnicity mainly work as 
suppliers, while Shan/Dai peoples operate 
as shop owners, and the Rohingya and Bamar 
as cutters, polishers, and street vendors. 
Some Rohingya and Bamar act as middlemen, 
selling stones for others. Depending on 
profits, they usually receive 10 to 15 percent 
of the sales price. Others catch customers in 
the street and bring them to shops, where 
they receive 20 to 30 percent of the profit on 
deals they facilitate. Some purchase jadeite 
for themselves and sell it in the street. 
Traders say it takes around 10,000 yuan in 
start-up capital to set up a small business as 
a mobile vendor. However, the real profits 
are in the trade of high-quality stones, which 
is much more capital intensive. In the Han 
trader community, operational capital usually 
comes in the form of informal credit between 
traders—often with jadeite used as security—
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as banks do not provide loans for this activity. 
As a general rule, you can borrow 50 to 70 
percent of the estimated value of the jadeite 
you deposit with the creditor at a monthly 
interest rate of 3 to 5 percent. 
What Is the Future of 
China’s Jadeite Trade?
In 2013, Ruili’s jadeite trade was booming. 
Caravans of buses arrived daily, delivering tour 
groups to the doorsteps of jadeite companies, 
which paid a percentage of their profits to the 
tour guides. Some traders said that jadeite 
prices had been rising up to 300 percent 
annually since 2009, and most believed prices 
would continue to rise, not least because 
supply was diminishing due to the conflict 
in Kachin state, and because the mines were 
allegedly depleting. However, when I arrived 
in Ruili again in 2014, the tour buses were 
gone, trade was slow, and many smaller shops 
had closed down. Traders ascribed the market 
implosion to the slowdown of the Chinese 
economy and to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
campaign. Jadeite is a favoured form of gift 
and payment for illicit favours in China. As 
economist Thomas Naylor, who has studied 
illicit trade in gemstones, points out: ‘In 
their role as financial assets, gemstones have 
particularly desirable characteristics. High in 
value relative to bulk, they are easy to hide 
and to smuggle; they are universal and very 
liquid; and they can be sold via marketing 
networks whose members share an affinity for 
“discretion”.’ In the anti-corruption era, few 
people dared to engage in illicit transactions 
using jadeite as a currency. 
However, jadeite traders with enough 
capital to sit out the market slowdown or to 
divert their investments were still optimistic. 
While demand for medium-priced jewellery 
had taken a blow, prices for high-grade 
jadeite were still rising. In 2013, the owner 
of a large jadeite company where I did parts 
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of my fieldwork used to specialise in selling 
medium-priced jewellery to tourists. The 
following year, he closed down that company 
and started a new one with a Chinese man from 
Myanmar, who had acquired mining licenses 
in the Kachin state. A stone excavated from 
one of these mines weighed more than six 
tonnes and was sold to a Shanghai investor 
for 600 million yuan, roughly 90 million USD. 
Echoing other traders, the company owner 
said that there would always be a demand for 
jade in China. 
This has to do with traditional Chinese 
beliefs regarding the function of jade in the 
corporeal and spiritual lives of people. Jade 
is believed to have at least six functions: 
stimulate good life energy (qi), absorb bad 
life energy, and condition blood pressure; 
protect people from accidents; bring good 
luck; transmit spirit (ling) and karma (ye) 
between people, for example as gifts and 
inheritance objects from mother to daughter; 
help people contemplate the universe and 
their place in it; and make people feel at 
peace. While institutional factors may 
explain the slowdown in the Chinese market 
for medium-priced jadeite jewelry since 2014, 
the persistence of these beliefs suggests that 
China’s jadeite market boom may not be over 
yet. 
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Loretta Ieng Tak Lou
Given the social and political significance of 
‘the peasant’ (nongmin) in modern Chinese 
history, it is surprising that the term nongmin is 
largely absent in Hong Kong, where discourses 
about individual farmers (nongfu) are far more 
prevalent. In tracing the modern etymology of 
Chinese peasants and the history of Hong Kong 
agriculture, this essay argues that the lack of 
‘class’ consciousness makes Hong Kong farmers 
even more vulnerable to the unceasing wave of 
urban sprawl.
In the Absence of 
a Peasantry, What, 
Then, Is a Hong Kong 
Farmer?
Hong Kong farmers working in the field. Photo by Loretta I. T. Lou.
Given the significance of ‘peasants’ 
(nongmin) in recent Chinese history, I was 
surprised to find that the term nongmin is 
pretty much absent in Hong Kong, where I 
have been researching the local green living 
movement since 2012. In China, nongmin 
is an expression of social and political 
importance. Since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 
the term nongmin not only refers to people 
whose livelihoods depend on agriculture, 
but is also incorporated into China’s 
administrative classification, along with 
other status groups such as workers (gongren) 
and urban residents (jumin). In her article 
‘What, Then, Is a Chinese Peasant?’, Mindi 
Schneider demonstrates that nongmin is 
a complex and multi-layered concept of 
multifarious meanings. For example, when 
it is a legal and administrative category, 
nongmin reflects the rigid separation 
between rural and urban hukou. As a cultural 
signifier, the term connotes ‘low quality’ and 
‘backwardness’. Indeed, Chinese peasants 
have been increasingly made the scapegoat 
for China’s food security and food safety 
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problems. As such, although the peasantry 
is an indispensable part of the political 
discourse and economic development in the 
PRC, they remain one of the most socially 
marginalised groups in China today. 
In Search of a Hong Kong 
Peasantry
Although the term nongmin can be found 
sporadically in writing, I have never heard 
people in Hong Kong, including those 
who actually engage in farming, use it in 
conversation. Instead, local people use 
‘farmer’ (nongfu) to refer to individuals 
who plant vegetables and fruit. Depending 
on where, how, and why they farm, those 
engaging in agricultural activities in Hong 
Kong can be further differentiated into urban 
farmers (dushi nongfu), organic farmers 
(youji nongfu), and leisure farmers (jiari 
nongfu), as well as others. 
Obviously, the vastly different historical 
trajectories of China and Hong Kong 
contribute to the lack of nongmin discourses 
in the former British colony. One reason 
that the expression is not more prevalent 
in Hong Kong has to do with how the term 
was constructed and loaded with its current 
meanings in mainland China during the 
twentieth century. According to Myron Cohen, 
nongmin was one of the many loanwords from 
Japan that entered China during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Like other similar linguistic imports that 
were borrowed to express the flood of new 
ideas and new social phenomena at that 
time, nongmin was a ‘modern word’ that was 
readily available for cultural and political 
elites to assign new meanings to it. Before 
then, the word was nowhere to be found 
even in the most authoritative Chinese-
English dictionaries. Indeed, individuals 
who worked in the farm were more commonly 
referred to as nongfu, nongding, nongjia, and 
nongren (translated into English as farmers, 
labourers, agriculturalists, etc.). As the rural 
population came to be known as nongmin 
in the mid-twentieth century, the term was 
constructed as a major obstacle to national 
development. However, under the influence 
of Marxism, nongmin uprisings had come to 
represent a major revolutionary force that 
had the potential to overthrow the old feudal 
society. 
Due to Hong Kong’s colonial past, local 
farmers (nongfu) were not subjected to this 
radical ‘nongmin project’. It could be said that 
Hong Kong farmers’ identities more closely 
resembled Chinese farmers before the mid-
twentieth century, in that they were primarily 
tied to agricultural work and the household 
without the class and revolutionary referent. 
Indeed, archival records suggest that during 
the 1920s and 1930s, Hong Kong farmers’ 
household economy, housing arrangements, 
and social practices differed little from 
their counterparts in Guangdong before the 
advent of the Communist’s ‘nongmin project’. 
Although many traditional Chinese customs 
had begun to fade away in urban Hong Kong 
and in mainland China, especially after the 
Communist revolution of 1949, peasant 
practices were preserved in rural New 
Territories well into the 1970s.
Trials and Tribulations
Up until the 1960s, farming provided a 
means of livelihood for the majority of 
the indigenous inhabitants, as well as the 
thousands of mainland Chinese refugees who 
settled in the New Territories as rice, vegetable, 
and livestock farmers in the aftermath of 
World War II and the Chinese Civil War. 
After the wars, subsistence agriculture 
was actively promoted by the colonial 
government and the Kadoorie Agricultural 
Aid Association (KAAA), a charity founded 
in 1951 by Lawrence and Horace Kadoorie to 
alleviate poverty and create social stability. 
Working with the Agricultural and Fisheries 
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Department, KAAA provided money and 
introduced various assistance programmes to 
Chinese refugees, such as setting them up as 
pig farmers and offering them interest-free or 
low-interest short-term loans. The Kadoorie 
brothers believed that philanthropy alone was 
not enough, so the goal of their organisation 
was to help the new arrivals to stand on their 
own feet and become self-sufficient farmers. 
And they succeeded. As the Chinese refugees 
settled in their new home and farms in the 
New Territories, they supplied an ever-
growing percentage of the colony’s food. 
At one point during the leftist riots in 1967, 
the self-sufficiency rate of locally grown 
vegetables peaked at 48.8 percent after the 
PRC curtailed food supplies to Hong Kong, 
forcing the colonial government to rely 
heavily on local produce.
Beginning in the late 1950s, Hong Kong’s 
subsistence agriculture came to an end when 
paddy rice farming went into a sharp decline. 
What is interesting, though, is that following 
the demise of paddy rice farming, there 
then came what Hoi Lung Lau describes as 
‘the most prosperous period of Hong Kong 
agriculture’ in the early 1970s and early 1980s. 
In addition to the growing demand for fresh 
vegetables and flowers from the urban middle 
class, Lau believes that the superior quality 
of Hong Kong vegetables accounted for the 
agricultural boom. As his interviewee vividly 
recalled: ‘As Chairman Mao made them put 
all the effort into growing grains, farmers in 
the mainland had gotten out of practice of 
growing tasty vegetables!’
Unfortunately, this golden era of agriculture 
did not last long. At first, farms were hit by 
labour shortages as villagers in the New 
Territories sought higher paid manufacturing 
and office jobs in the city. Later, when China 
opened up its market in 1978, manufacturing 
factories were relocated to China while 
Hong Kong repositioned itself as Asia’s 
financial hub with a thriving real estate 
market. Consequently, many farms were lost 
to urban sprawl and the total area of arable 
land continued to decrease. Meanwhile, 
the increased import of food from China 
caused Hong Kong’s food self-sufficiency 
rate to plummet dramatically, driving local 
agriculture to the brink of extinction. By the 
1980s, Hong Kong no longer produced rice. 
Although fresh vegetables are still grown in 
the New Territories, the total proportion of 
local vegetables declined from 40 percent 
in the 1960s to 2.3 percent in 2013. Today, 
90 percent of the food supply in Hong Kong 
is imported, with the majority of it from the 
PRC. 
The Emergence of a New 
Kind of Farmer
As incidents of food scandals soar in 
China, Hong Kong people have become 
increasingly concerned about their heavy 
dependence on China for their food supply. 
While other factors, such as the rise of local 
consciousness, are also responsible for 
the Agricultural Revitalisation Movement 
(fugeng yundong), food safety is no doubt a 
major catalyst. With help from land activists, 
environmentalists, and local food consumers, 
Hong Kong farmers have joined in the 
movement against unbridled urbanisation and 
unchecked developmentalism. Even though 
the farmers usually prefer to take a back seat 
and let the activists do the actual organising, 
during the process of mobilisation, farmers 
in Hong Kong have learned to redefine their 
social and cultural identity by emphasising 
their contribution to sustainability and their 
role as defenders of Hong Kong’s remaining 
farms. 
In contrast to the nongmin in China, 
who continue to suffer from all kinds of 
stigma and discrimination, nongfu in Hong 
Kong seem to have overcome the bias that 
farming is an inferior occupation. Since the 
first mobilisation against land-grabbing in 
2008 (also known as the Choi Yuen Village 
Incident), Hong Kong farmers have assumed 
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a more dignified image. Today, farmers in 
Hong Kong no longer consider agriculture as 
an obstacle to Hong Kong’s socioeconomic 
development—a metanarrative that has held 
strong until very recently. Rather, they have 
come to see agriculture as an indispensable 
element of the city, an idea that was clearly 
articulated during the first Hong Kong 
Agricultural Forum in 2013.
Farmers without Class 
Consciousness
Despite their new cultural identity, Hong 
Kong nongfu do not wield any more political 
power than the nongmin in the PRC. In a way, 
Hong Kong farmers could face extinction 
even sooner because they lack the class 
consciousness that unifies the peasantry 
in China. After all, it is much easier to 
eliminate some 4,600 farmers, most of which 
are tenants without land ownership, than to 
eliminate an entire peasant ‘class’ without 
causing some social unrest. Moreover, despite 
their close affinity with land activists, in 
reality Hong Kong farmers lack political 
power to influence agricultural policies. For 
one, their ‘professional representative’ in the 
Legislative Council is elected by a small group 
of elite members, who are ardent partisans of 
the government’s pro-growth developmental 
strategies. 
To pacify farmers and to show governmental 
commitment to supporting local agriculture, 
the government inaugurated a Hydroponic 
Centre in 2013 to promote the benefits 
of growing vegetables in a controlled 
environment. While vertical hydroponics 
appears to support local agriculture and 
responds to Hong Kong people’s increasing 
demand for ‘clean vegetables’, the practice 
is highly unpopular among farmers in the 
New Territories, who see it as a plot to 
uproot them from their land, allowing the 
government to continue to push forward its 
urbanisation agenda. Speaking at the Hong 
Kong Agricultural Forum in 2013, TV, a farmer 
at the Ma Po Po Community Farm, made an 
analogy between farmers and vegetables on a 
plate of barbecued pork rice (char siu faan): 
‘Unorganised farmers are like the two pieces 
of side vegetables on the plate. Finance and 
real estate are the barbecued pork and we all 
want more of that. However, we also know 
that eating too much meat is no good for our 
health, so we add two pieces of vegetables 
on the side. The side vegetables are like our 
farmers and our local agriculture. They are 
good on display, but they are dispensable.’ 
Indeed, Hong Kong farmers may have escaped 
the stigma and discrimination associated 
with their nongmin counterparts in the PRC, 
but in a city where an inch of land is worth 
an ounce of gold, they might not be able to 
escape being devoured by the unceasing wave 
of urban sprawl that is bound to happen over 
the next fifteen years.
Loretta Ieng Tak Lou
Loretta I. T. Lou is Research Fellow 
in the Department of Sociology 
at the University of Warwick 
and a Postdoctoral Associate at 
Oxford’s Institute of Social and 
Cultural Anthropology. Loretta’s 
research interests lie in the areas 
of the environment, health, science 
and technology studies, social 
movements, and social changes in 
Greater China, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.
MADE IN CHINA - WINDOW ON ASIA 59
Industrial Landscapes of 
Socialist Realsim
Craig A. Smith
Datong, Forever in Limbo
Jonathan Kinkel
Resurrecting the Dead
Ivan Franceschini
WORK OF 
ARTS
60 MADE IN CHINA -  WORK OF ARTS
Craig A. Smith
Previous page: ‘As a Nation, We Won Our Rights, 
Our Dream. Not So Where Capital Reigns 
Supreme,’ E. Maloletkov, Moscow 1957.
Although industrial landscapes today appear as 
one of the most alien of art forms, they were once 
fundamental as backgrounds of socialist realist 
paintings. This essay examines the legacies of 
two masters of the genre in China and North 
Korea—Song Wenzhi (1919–1999) and Chōng 
Yōngman (1938–1999)—and demonstrates how 
different revolutionary histories have led to a 
divergence in legacy and achievement.
To many in the twenty-first century, the 
industrial landscape appears as one of the 
most alien of art forms. Yet, the billowing 
fumes of endless smokestacks or the web of 
piping from a glistening petroleum plant once 
made the best representatives of socialist 
realist painting. Socialist realist art portrayed 
ideal life in socialist states—anchored in 
communism, class-consciousness, and 
loyalty to the party and the people. While 
many Soviet works showed elements of the 
genre decades earlier, artists and theorists 
from the Soviet Union only began officially 
promoting socialist realism as a ‘true and 
historically concrete depiction of reality in its 
revolutionary development’ at the Congress 
of Soviet Writers in 1934, leading to its spread 
around the world. The genre then arrived in 
China and Korea as an already stylised form 
with a long history. While in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) it fell into oblivion 
during the reform period, it still continues to 
dominate in the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea (DPRK) today. 
In the Soviet Union, artists included 
industrial landscapes in the background of 
propaganda and artwork. The backgrounds 
reflected the life, and idealised the ambitions, 
of the working class. There was a marked 
emphasis on klassovost, sometimes translated 
as class-consciousness. Exemplars of the 
genre also showed partinost, loyalty to the 
party and its principles, and norodnost, the 
ambitions of the people or nation. While 
socialist realist industrial landscapes 
remained at the margins of the socialist 
realist genre in the Soviet Union, in the PRC 
and the DPRK, both of which have a long 
artistic tradition of landscape painting, these 
industrial scenes became the focus of artists’ 
work for a short time in the mid-1970s. This 
essay examines the legacies of Song Wenzhi 
(1919–1999) and Chōng Yōngman (1938–1999), 
the most accomplished artists of industrial 
landscapes in the two countries, showing how 
different revolutionary histories have led to a 
divergence in legacy and achievement.
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Song Wenzhi and 
Industrial China
In China, it was Song Wenzhi who produced 
the most popular examples of socialist realist 
industrial landscapes. Song was a classically 
trained artist with a strong background in 
landscape painting. Although he was forced to 
spend the first years of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–1976) in a factory, he resumed painting 
in 1972. In 1973, he was appointed deputy 
director of Nanjing’s Provincial Fine Arts 
Work Team. There, he continued to create 
beautiful landscape paintings. However, his 
art began to show elements of industrial 
modernity, sublimely sliding between 
traditional Chinese landscapes and socialist 
realist images of industry.
In many of Song’s paintings, he introduced 
modern elements as a subtle but dominating 
feature, such as in ‘Taihu’s New Look’ (taihu 
xinzhuang). Song only fully surrendered to the 
industrial landscape genre in a few paintings, 
producing images that not only stand out as 
excellent examples of traditional Chinese 
painting, but also remain iconic reminders of 
the time. Of these, the most memorable is his 
1975 masterpiece ‘Daqing Blossoms along the 
Yangzi River’ (yangzijiang pan daqing hua). 
Through Song’s reformed classical technique, 
mountains metamorphose into factories and 
flowers blossom as the billowing clouds from 
a forest of smokestacks. 
Song did not continue with the genre. 
Whatever compelled him to create these 
paintings—whether it was the watchful eye 
of his superiors, the pull of a revolutionary 
‘market’, or his own experiences at the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution—at 
the end of the Maoist era he turned back to 
traditional landscapes. While continuing to 
sketch the occasional power line, he never 
returned to the subject of industrial beauty. 
The genre had no place in the opening up and 
reform period that China entered in 1978. 
‘Taihu’s New Look’, Song Wenzhi (1979)
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‘Daqing Blossoms along the Yangzi River’, Song Wenzhi (1975)
This was not the case in the DPRK, however, 
where the revolution never ended.
Chōng Yōngman’s 
Depiction of History and 
the Workers
In 1973, just two years before Song painted 
‘Daqing Blossoms’, one of the most 
celebrated North Korean painters Chōng 
Yōngman produced an industrial landscape 
that captivated the country and led to a 
reconsideration of the genre of Chosōnhwa 
(Korean Painting). Largely due to the 
historical, artistic, and ideological success 
of ‘Evening Glow over Kangsōn Steelworks’ 
(gangseon-ui-no-eul), Chōng later became 
vice-president of the Mansudae Studio and 
a chairman of the central committee of the 
Korean Artists Federation.
The Kangsōn Steel Mill was the birthplace 
of the Chollima Movement, an ideologically 
driven productivity campaign initiated by Kim 
Il-sung when he visited the mill in December 
1956. Unlike China’s Great Leap Forward and 
the Stakhanovite Movement of the Soviet 
Union, North Korea’s Chollima Movement 
has remained at the centre of national 
identity. The chollima refers to a horse of 
unimaginable speed in East Asian legends, 
indicating the astounding potential of the 
North Korean worker. Images of the horse 
are still evident everywhere in North Korea 
today, but Chōng’s painting of the factory is 
just as much a symbol of this decisive period 
in DPRK history.
‘Kangsōn Steelworks’ was Chōng’s most 
important work, marking a departure from 
the simple and powerful ink Chosōnhwa and 
creating an iconic image that is still a common 
sight today. The image once featured on the 
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ten won bill; it also serves as a backdrop for 
New Year’s posters, and greets visitors to 
the Korean Museum of Art in Pyongyang. 
Moreover, the use of ‘Kangsōn Steelworks’ 
in official media ensures that tourists to 
North Korea inevitably come across this 
mesmerising painting in either its original 
form, or as the background for numerous 
posters that have since incorporated the 
classic painting in their own imagery.
Real and Ideal Beauty
Socialist realist landscapes should 
concentrate upon the ideal reality—rather 
than the real reality—for the worker, the 
scientist, and the farmer. Nowhere is this 
better achieved than in the DPRK. The 
socialist realist industrial landscape has long 
fallen out of fashion in Russia, and no longer 
has a place in post-socialist China, where 
images of smokestacks are reminders of the 
problems of air pollution, rather than of the 
glorious worker. However, the landscape still 
holds its symbolic value in Pyongyang, where 
the state glorifies the role of the worker in the 
continued struggle to maintain and improve 
the nation and the Party.
(1) ‘Evening Glow over Kangsōn Steelworks’, Chōng Yōngman (1973). (2) ‘The worker and the soldier race 
forth on a chollima. A strong, great nation! Wishing everyone a Happy New Year, 2010.’ (3) The ten won 
bill of the DPRK.
(1)
(2) (3)
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Although Song Wenzhi adapted traditional 
Chinese art in an innovative and a compelling 
fashion to produce beautiful paintings of the 
country’s industrial accomplishments, Chōng 
Yōngman’s ‘Kangsōn Steelworks’ has stood 
the test of time. Up to this day, it continues to 
captivate the people due to its vivid portrayal 
of industrial beauty, and finds official support 
due to its ideological correctness in relation 
to the political discourse of the ruling Party. 
The piece’s relationship to the historical 
significance of the Chollima Movement 
cements it as an exemplar in socialist realist 
art—uniting the ambitions of the Party, the 
nation, and the working class in a way that 
could not be achieved in the context of 
China’s more contentious and complicated 
revolutionary history. 
But Chōng’s achievement is not only 
ideological. Even before global concerns 
with climate change, few found beauty in 
images of polluting gases billowing into the 
air. However, those of us who have stood on 
concrete rooftops and watched the sun set in 
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a torrent of colours filtered through a wall of 
effluvia know that these paintings are more 
than markers of material development. They 
are beautiful works of art.
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The 2015 documentary The Chinese Mayor by 
Zhou Hao documents the story of Datong, Shanxi 
province, as its leaders embark on an ambitious 
plan to transform the city into a tourist 
destination. Still, although the filmmakers 
devote sustained attention to the relocated 
residents and their demolished homes, the film 
is no exposé: it is mostly intended to educate an 
international audience on the internal workings 
of the Chinese policy-making process.
Datong, Forever in 
Limbo
The history of the city of Datong, Shanxi 
province, plays a crucial role in The Chinese 
Mayor, a 2015 documentary by producer Zhao 
Qi and director Zhou Hao. The filmmakers 
explain at the outset that Datong was an 
imperial capital sixteen centuries ago, but 
at the turn of the twenty-first century it 
had become the most polluted city in China. 
Under his tenure as mayor of Datong from 
2008 to 2013, Geng Yanbo had an ambitious 
plan: transform the city into a destination for 
visitors and capital by rebuilding the ancient 
city wall, thereby restoring the city’s rich 
cultural and historical heritage. The only 
catch? As many as half a million people had 
to be relocated from their homes in order to 
complete the project. 
The Chinese Mayor documents the city, 
its leaders, and its residents as the project 
unfolds, and although the filmmakers devote 
sustained attention to the residents relocated 
and the homes demolished to make way for 
the mayor’s ambitions, the film is no exposé. 
According to Zhao, the film primarily aimed 
to educate an international audience on the 
internal workings of the Chinese policy-
making process and to stimulate new ways 
of thinking about China. In accomplishing 
these goals, the filmmakers embed themes 
Still from The Chinese Mayor, directed by Zhou Hao, 2015.
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of tradition, grievance, and desperation 
that colour contemporary China’s complex 
patterns of state-society relations. This 
approach provides rare glimpses into 
contemporary China’s political system—a 
fact to which their 2015 Sundance Special 
Jury Prize for Unparalleled Access attests—
as well as into China’s distinct political-legal 
tradition. The filmmakers also strive to shape 
their rare footage into a coherent narrative 
with Mayor Geng at the center and the 
residents of Datong, who are ultimately left 
in limbo by larger political machinations, in 
supporting roles. 
Concession Via 
Confrontation
Unsurprisingly, the mayor’s grand plan 
to rebuild cultural Datong’s old city wall 
encounters fierce resistance from several 
residents faced with the demolition of their 
homes. Recounted using extensive footage of 
the mayor’s daily life and interactions with 
displaced citizens, the filmmakers tell a story 
of demolition and displacement familiar in 
many parts of the world, but which takes on a 
different hue in the context of China’s unique 
tradition of ruler-subject relations. Datong’s 
culturally themed land redevelopment is 
the mayor’s brainchild, and he supervises or 
intervenes when necessary in the distribution 
of new apartments built to replace the 
demolished ones. Assigning a new flat to this 
or that citizen becomes the mayor’s preferred 
method of gaining individual compliance 
with the forced relocations.  
The narrative hinges on the development 
of a series of characters who express direct 
grievances to the mayor in the street or 
at demolition sites. In tears, one woman 
confronts the mayor while falling repeatedly 
and explains that due to her medical problems, 
she needs an apartment near her daughter’s 
workplace. The mayor and his staff instruct 
her to wait ten days for a new apartment 
and assure her that they will address her 
concerns, on the condition that her medical 
situation can be confirmed. Another resident 
displaying facial injuries finds the mayor 
on the street and claims to have endured 
a beating from a deputy leader during the 
premature demolition of his home. After 
some squabbling, a member of the mayor’s 
staff promises the man an apartment in what 
sounds like an idyllic community, ‘Willow 
Garden’. An elderly resident, identified 
as ‘Hua’, confronts the mayor in separate 
scenes outside the mayoral residence (which, 
according to subtitles, is located in a military 
compound ‘for safety reasons’). Instead of 
walking past her, the mayor listens to Hua’s 
requests for compensation for her destroyed 
house and her arguments that she cannot 
climb the stairs to the sixth-floor apartment 
provided by the government. Mayor Geng 
tells her that she is asking for too much, but 
once he is in his car with his staff, he discusses 
whether he can get her an apartment on a 
lower floor.  
Direct, impromptu interaction between 
citizens and government is not unique to 
Datong’s demolition, but is rooted in a 
tradition of grievance and dialogue that has in 
some form mediated the relationship between 
ruler and subject in China for millennia. In 
the influential historical narrative Zuo’s 
Commentary (Zuozhuan), which dates back 
to the late fourth century BC, a politician 
A citizen complains about official 
misbehaviour.
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reasons that it is better to learn from citizens’ 
grievances than to silence them: ‘I have heard 
of reducing grievances by means of loyalty 
and kindness; I have not heard of preventing 
grievances by exercising power… doing 
so would be like trying to prevent a river 
from overflowing with a dike… so I listen to 
criticism as a remedy.’
The influence of this tradition was also 
explicitly recognised at the beginning of 
the Communist era, when ‘the right to make 
written or oral complaints’ (shumian konggao 
huozhe koutou konggao de quanli) to organs of 
the state was enshrined in Article 97 of the 
original 1954 PRC Constitution. Though far 
from justiciable, the right to confront the state 
in this manner embodies the uniqueness of the 
Chinese political-legal system—it is among 
the few sections of the original Constitution 
of the People’s Republic of China that was not 
lifted directly from the 1936 Soviet version.
Desperation in the 
Narrative 
The tradition of citizens’ direct 
confrontation of government officials also 
survives in today’s China in part because 
official channels for legal grievances are 
either inaccessible or easily subject to elite 
manipulation. A prominent supporting 
character in the film is identified as Hui, 
who is distinguished by her extensive legal 
knowledge and litigious outlook (in one 
scene, she recites State Council decrees for 
the camera from memory). Hui questions 
whether the demolition of her family’s home 
exposes broader contradictions in Chinese 
society: ‘Should I tell [my son] to trust the 
law and the government, and stand up for 
his rights? Or should I just tell him to give 
up?’ When she confronts the mayor directly, 
Hui challenges his claim that her house 
was constructed illegally: ‘That’s a problem 
caused by the government. How come the 
government wasn’t supervising before but 
blames the fault on us now?’ The mayor replies 
feebly: ‘Who never made a mistake?’ Shortly 
thereafter, with Hui’s appeals to China’s 
Supreme People’s Court finally denied, the 
camera surveys the demolished ruins of her 
house.   
Scenes like these, in which citizens with 
seemingly legitimate claims cannot save 
their homes, build an aura of desperation 
that is carried forward as several characters 
in the film threaten suicide or indirectly 
reference death. One unidentified character 
resists the demolition of her brother’s house 
and describes her brother and their family’s 
forced relocation by saying: ‘He ripped his 
belly open with a knife... I’ll kill myself too... 
Let the corrupt rich guys live. We’re not 
living!’ The desperation of the mayor’s own 
family also renders palpable the anxieties of 
people affected by the mayor’s grand plans. 
For instance, Mayor Geng’s wife confronts 
him at meetings and phones him repeatedly 
to bemoan their diminished family life: ‘Have 
you [the mayor] had enough of living? Look 
at you.’ In response, the mayor’s calm, even 
affable demeanor comes off as ominous given 
the desperation of those surrounding him. 
When Mayor Geng tries to reassure his wife 
that he is not overworked, she replies: ‘Are 
you trying to kill me?’
Hui argues with mayor Geng.
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An Unfamiliar Resolution
As the mayor’s promises of new housing add 
up, and with desperation rising, an unanswered 
question looms in the background: what will 
happen if these pledges of new, alternative 
housing go unfulfilled? Near the end of 
the film, the central government ‘rotates’ 
(ganbu jiaoliu) Mayor Geng to a new post as 
Mayor of Taiyuan, before the completion of 
Datong’s massive relocation and construction 
project. For the Western audiences targeted 
by the film’s producers, rotation of mayors 
is most likely an unfamiliar concept. In 
China, however, the rotation of mayors and 
other local officials to several-year stints in 
different localities has long been a hallmark 
of China’s Communist nomenklatura system, 
a feature designed to prevent government 
officials from establishing parochial fiefdoms 
borne from close ties with local elites.
 
To convey the import of the mayor’s abrupt 
departure, the film employs a conversation 
between a young boy holding a golden toy 
machine gun and a woman (presumably 
the boy’s mother). Amid large street 
demonstrations blocking traffic in protest at 
the mayor’s transfer, the boy asks: ‘Why are 
they stopping the buses?’ She replies: ‘They’re 
asking for housing. No one will give them 
housing after Mayor Geng leaves. So, they’re 
unhappy.’ This explanation injects ambiguity 
into the film’s resolution, as it is more cynical 
than the protesters’ seemingly sincere chants 
of ‘Come back, Mayor Geng!’
In these final scenes, where it is unclear 
whether Datong is furious over broken 
housing promises or distraught to lose a 
respected leader, the residents of Datong 
emerge as more sympathetic than the title 
character. Intriguingly, this tension is 
perhaps reflected in the alternative titles of 
the film—in some places the title is simply 
Datong instead of The Chinese Mayor. In 
contrast with the purgatory into which large, 
publicly financed reconstruction projects 
throw the relocated residents of cities like 
Datong—not to mention the three billion USD 
debt the mayor leaves behind—the rotation 
does not portend major consequences for 
Geng. In fact, the mayor ultimately plans to 
complete his political legacy in an even larger 
city, Shanxi’s provincial capital Taiyuan, with 
a chance to dislocate even more residents: ‘I 
wish I could have completed all my plans in 
Datong. But since I’ve been transferred, I’ll 
create a “Cultural Taiyuan”.’ In the end, while 
the filmmakers’ primary narrative intention 
might have been to capture the struggles faced 
by an idealistic mayor, they ultimately found 
greater success telling an historically infused 
story of affected residents, compelled to 
make sense of the debt-fuelled and politically 
engineered limbo thrust upon them.
A young boy inquires about the protests that 
followed the mayor’s abrupt departure from 
Datong.
69MADE IN CHINA -  WORK OF ARTS
Ivan Franceschini
Lu Xun today lives a new life in his homeland 
as well as abroad. However, given the vastness 
and unevenness of his oeuvre, not all his works 
receive the same attention. In particular, one 
collection of short stories stands out for their 
neglect: Old Tales Retold, a series of comic 
sketches based on ancient Chinese myths and 
legends published shortly before his death. This 
essay focusses on this semi-forgotten pearl and 
its relevance for today’s readers.
Resurrecting the 
Dead
On several occasions during his lifetime, 
Lu Xun (1881–1936) expressed concern over 
what would happen to his legacy after his 
death. As Eileen J. Cheng has noted, ‘Lu Xun 
was acutely aware that after the death of the 
subject, texts representing the dead may take 
on lives of their own, as posthumous accounts 
can no longer be challenged by the deceased 
subject. Indeed, his writings self-consciously 
deal with the ethics of narration and the limits 
of representation, as he pondered over the 
following questions: Who has the authority 
or “sanction” to narrate? Can a text truly 
represent a subject, or does it, in the end, 
just betray it?’ Beyond the issue of people 
using his name for personal gain, Lu Xun 
worried that his writing would be distorted 
and manipulated to further factional and 
ideological battles. Sadly, his worst fears 
were to come true. In a eulogy written for the 
first anniversary of the writer’s death, Mao 
Zedong hailed him as ‘the sage of modern 
The real misfortune suffered by men of letters 
lies not in being ignored and attacked in their 
lifetime, but comes after death when their words 
and conduct cease to exist; idlers pass themselves 
off as their confidantes spreading gossip and 
rumour every which way for the sake of self-
promotion. For the sake of making a little money, 
even a corpse becomes a tool by which they seek 
to secure fame and fortune, and it is this that is 
truly lamentable.
Lu Xun, ‘In Memory of Wei Suyuan’, 16 July 
1934 (translated by Theodore Huters)
Lu Xun’s mortuary portrait, 1936.
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China’ (xiandai zhongguo de shengren), on par 
with Confucius, ‘the sage of feudal China’—
an ironic fate for an intellectual who had 
spent his life attempting to break the ancient 
philosopher’s hold on Chinese society. This 
was the first of several speeches and articles in 
which Mao would appropriate Lu Xun for his 
political cause. That he was successful in this 
manipulation can be seen from the fact that 
after 1949, while the writer’s former disciples 
and friends were falling victim to purges and 
violence, Lu Xun’s name and oeuvre were 
used to justify any kind of foulness. 
In spite of this, Lu Xun’s legacy managed to 
survive and today the writer lives a new life 
in his homeland as well as abroad. In China, 
over the past decade citations and photos 
of Lu Xun have appeared frequently on the 
Internet as Chinese netizens mobilised to 
denounce the latest injustice perpetrated 
by officials—be it the suppression of land 
protests, the muffling of critical voices, or 
the hypocrisy and abuses of the ruling class. 
Images and characters from Lu Xun’s work 
still appear in the conversations of ordinary 
people, from the ‘iron house’ (tiewu) where 
people are sleeping, unaware that they will 
soon be devoured by a fire raging outside, to 
the ‘cannibalistic ethic’ (chiren de lijiao) of 
Chinese society; from the scoundrel Ah Q, 
to the failed scholar Kong Yiji. I remember 
my surprise when, during a meeting at a 
women rights NGO in Beijing a few years ago, 
one activist referred to the ‘bloody mantou’ 
(xue mantou)—a trope from one of Lu Xun’s 
most famous short stories, which has come 
to indicate the gullibility of common people, 
always ready to believe in the existence 
of absurd miraculous remedies for their 
problems—to complain about the obtuseness 
of those who refused to follow her advice. 
Abroad, there has been a flourishing of new 
translations of Lu Xun into foreign languages, 
with the latest—a collection of essays entitled 
Jottings under Lamplight—having been 
published only a couple of months ago. This 
has been accompanied by the appearance of 
several critical studies of remarkable breadth 
and profundity, such as Gloria Davies’s Lu 
Xun’s Revolution (2013), Eva Shan Chou’s 
Memory, Violence, Queues (2012), and 
Eileen J. Cheng’s Literary Remains (2013), 
to mention just a few. However, given the 
vastness and unevenness of the writer’s 
oeuvre, not all his works receive the same 
attention. In particular, one collection of 
short stories stands out for their neglect: Old 
Tales Retold (gushi xinbian), a series of comic 
sketches based on ancient Chinese myths and 
legends that Lu Xun published shortly before 
his death. It is on this semi-forgotten pearl—
and its relevance for today’s readers—that 
this short essay will focus.
The Old Tales Retold  
Old Tales Retold includes eight, short 
comic stories based on episodes drawn from 
Chinese classics. In them, we find divinities 
depicted as ordinary human beings, such 
as the goddess Nüwa, who creates mankind 
out of sheer boredom only to get annoyed 
with her creation immediately thereafter. 
Legendary heroes face ordinary challenges, 
such as an aged Hou Yi, a mythical archer who 
had saved the world, who has to deal with a 
disgruntled wife and a backstabbing disciple; 
or Yu, the legendary tamer of the floods, who 
is confronted with the jeers of incompetent 
scholars and corrupt officials. Some figures 
come straight out of the historical annals, 
such as Bo Yi and Shuqi, two elders who 
met a tragic end because of their stubborn 
observance of Confucian morality. Others 
are the stuff of legends, such as Mei Jianchi, 
a young boy who resorts to black magic to 
avenge his dead father. Obviously, there is 
no lack of philosophers. Laozi, Mozi, and 
Zhuangzi appear as main characters in three 
of the tales. Confucius features only in an 
ancillary role—an absence that is far from 
surprising if we consider what Lu Xun wrote 
in 1926 in the afterword to his collection of 
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essays Graves (here translated by Theodore 
Huters): ‘As for my thinking, I have often been 
poisoned by Zhuangzi and Hanfeizi, at times 
quite casually and at others quite vigorously. 
I read the Confucian books earliest and most 
thoroughly, but they for some reason seem to 
have little connection with me.’ 
Since their publication in January 1936, 
the Old Tales Retold never enjoyed particular 
renown among critics. Many were puzzled by 
a work so far from the realism of the writer’s 
earlier fiction. In his preface, Lu Xun himself 
expressed scepticism about the literary 
value of this oeuvre: ‘Most of these tales 
have been written in a rush, and fall short 
of the name ‘story’ as defined by literary 
criticism…. Moreover, having less respect 
for the ancients than for contemporaries, on 
occasions I could not avoid facetiousness.’ 
Indeed, only a few months before drafting 
the bulk of those stories, the writer had 
been involved in a polemic with Lin Yutang 
and other proponents on the importance of 
‘humour’ (youmo) in literature, going so far 
as to paraphrase Kierkegaard on the dangers 
of writing for the sheer amusement of the 
public:
A theatre catches fire. The clown steps to 
the front of the stage to announce the fact to 
the audience, who think it a joke and applaud. 
Then the clown announces again that there 
is a fire, but they roar with laughter and clap 
more loudly than ever. No doubt the world 
will end amid the general applause of these 
laughter-loving people who take everything 
as a joke. (Translated by Yang Xianyi and 
Gladys Yang)
While the Chinese critical debate has 
featured endless theoretical arguments about 
narrative techniques and on whether this 
book should be considered satire or historical 
fiction, discussions among the few scholars 
based outside China who did not dismiss this 
work as irrelevant have been more sanguine. 
In 1961, in his ground-breaking A History of 
Modern Chinese Fiction, C. T. Hsia described 
the Old Tales Retold in these terms: ‘In his 
fear of searching his own mind and disclosing 
thereby his pessimistic and sombre view of 
China at complete variance with his professed 
Communist faith, Lu [Xun] could only repress 
his deep-seated personal emotions in the 
service of political satire. The resulting levity 
and chaos … mark the sad degeneration of a 
distinguished if narrow talent for fiction.’ The 
following year, another giant in the study of 
modern Chinese literature, Jaroslav Průšek, 
retorted: ‘[Lu Xun’s] pictures [in the Old 
Tales Retold] have, namely, a multiplicity of 
meanings, every moment relating to a number 
of layers of reality, their changing hues 
reminiscent of a winding scarf of rainbow 
colours. In this many-facetted iridescence 
lies the individuality and originality of Lu 
[Xun]’s artistic technique, which C. T. Hsia 
is unable to grasp….’ This rebuttal did not 
convince Hsia, however, who penned another 
response reiterating his opinion, citing 
Lu Xun’s own self-deprecatory preface as 
evidence of the scarce value of the book. 
Why Read the Old Tales 
Retold Today?
If even Lu Xun himself supposedly did 
not believe in the artistic significance of 
his Old Tales Retold, why rediscover this 
often overlooked book today? There are 
at least three reasons. First, these stories 
offer a glimpse into intellectual debates in 
Republican China that still bear relevance to 
China today—particularly with regard to the 
relationship between politics and tradition, 
individuals and society, and conservation and 
innovation. Second, by portraying ancient 
sages and legendary heroes not as hieratical 
semi-deities but as flawed human beings, Lu 
Xun undermines a certain kind of ‘orientalist’ 
discourse that to this day remains widespread 
in foreign media and academia (does this ring 
any Bell?). Although Ann Louise Huss has—
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not without reason—associated the writer’s 
ridicule of these figures to the physical and 
psychological violence against intellectuals 
that would be carried out during the Cultural 
Revolution some four decades later, the 
humour of the Old Tales Retold undeniably 
provides a powerful antidote against the 
tendency to take the classics too seriously and 
to read everything related to China through 
pseudo-Confucian lenses. Finally, and most 
importantly, these tales, in their minimalism, 
offer a corrosive critique of any attempt at 
manipulating Chinese tradition for political 
purpose. 
At its recently concluded Nineteenth 
Congress, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has amended its Constitution to 
include the ‘promotion of the creative 
transformation and innovative development 
of outstanding Chinese traditional culture’ 
in its mission. And it is not a secret that 
‘Chinese traditional culture’—or at least an 
emasculated version of it—is at the core of the 
CCP’s effort to promote China’s soft power 
abroad, not least through a network of more 
than five hundred Confucius Institutes. In a 
curious assonance, in 1927, in one of his most 
pointed essays against Chinese tradition, Lu 
Xun wrote of the Chinese classics as a ‘soft 
knife’ (ruan daozi), saying that the reason 
they are so fearsome is that readers are not 
alert to their danger, as they see them as being 
harmless. Towards the end of his life, in an 
essay entitled ‘Confucius in Modern China’ 
published in 1935, he further elaborated on 
why he felt the need to attack the ancient 
philosopher in his writings:
Revulsion for the monk leads to distaste for 
the habit, and the exploitation of Confucius as 
an instrument to gain a certain end becoming 
once more transparently obvious, the desire 
to dethrone him grew the more potent. 
Therefore, when Confucius is dressed in 
perfect dignity, articles and works exposing 
his flaws are bound to appear. Confucius 
though he be, he must have his flaws. In 
normal times no one would pay them any 
heed, because a sage is still a man, and as such 
they may be forgiven him. Yet if the disciples 
of the Sage come forth and start prating, 
telling us that the Sage was this and was that, 
and therefore you must be likewise, people 
will not be able to keep from laughing out 
loud. (Translated by David Pollard)
In times like these, when Chinese tradition 
is once again resurrected to serve dubious 
political purposes, it is more important than 
ever to rediscover the irony and sarcasm of the 
Old Tales Retold. This is necessary not only to 
remind ourselves to maintain an approach to 
Chinese tradition devoid of dogmatism, but 
also to undermine the hegemonic effort of 
the propaganda of the CCP and the shallow 
authoritativeness of today’s orientalists. 
While it is impossible to know whether by 
doing so we are betraying Lu Xun’s intentions, 
there is a good chance that he would not have 
minded this opportunity ‘to make the ancients 
out as more dead than they already are’.
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Over the past decade, China’s increasing 
presence on the African continent has been 
a source of global debate, excitement, and 
anxiety. In her new book The Specter of Global 
China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment 
in Africa (Chicago University Press, 2017), 
Ching Kwan Lee draws on six years of in-
depth fieldwork to ask a new set of questions.
Public debate on ‘China in Africa’ has tended 
to be rather hyperbolic in tone, and often 
fixates on China as a new colonial power. This 
book poses a different set of questions. Can you 
talk about why a shift in focus was necessary?
Ching Kwan Lee: Even though terms such 
as scramble, empire, and hegemony resonate 
with many people’s fears and preconceptions, 
we run into serious definitional, empirical, 
and historical problems when we deploy 
them analytically, and not just for their 
rhetorical and political effects. Just consider 
some basic facts: there is so far no military 
occupation by China in Africa, no chartered 
companies with exclusive or sovereign 
trading rights, no religious proselytising—
all things that typically accompanied 
colonialism over decades, if not centuries. 
To date, one would be hard pressed to find 
empirical evidence even of China’s informal 
Ching Kwan Lee on 
The Specter of Global China
‘imperial influence’ in Africa. Rather, the 
phenomenon of global China is about China 
seeking spatial and political fixes to its 
resource and profit bottleneck, in the context 
of a national and global over-accumulation 
crisis, with no preordained or guaranteed 
outcome. For me, what is theoretically and 
politically significant about China in Africa is 
not the millions of migrant entrepreneurs or 
private companies from China. These types 
of investors hail from different countries 
(not just from China) and are found in many 
parts of the world (not just Africa). What is 
most intriguing is Chinese state investment, 
and the question is whether it represents a 
variety of capital that is different from global 
private capital—whether it has peculiar 
interests, practices, and ethos. If so, does it 
bring distinct potentials or perils to African 
development? 
The key finding of this study is that Chinese 
capital in Africa can, indeed, be different in 
nature than global private capital. Can you 
briefly outline the defining features of Chinese 
capital’s divergence?
CKL: Through a sustained comparison 
between Chinese state capital and global 
private capital in Zambia’s copper and 
construction sectors, I found that these 
two types have divergent imperatives of 
accumulation, driving them to run different 
regimes of production, which in turn were 
enabled by different ethoses of management. 
Specifically, Chinese state capital is 
characterised by a logic of encompassing 
accumulation (i.e. profit making, extending 
China’s political and diplomatic influence, 
and gaining source access to strategic 
minerals) as opposed to global private 
capital’s profit maximisation. Whereas 
Chinese state capital runs a production-
driven regime of labour exploitation, global 
private capital operated a finance-driven 
regime of labour exclusion and casualisation. 
Whereas collective asceticism has animated 
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the Chinese managerial ethos, individualistic 
careerism has defined that of its global private 
counterparts. Counterintuitively, Chinese 
state capital, rather than being more dominant 
and influential, has made more compromises 
to accommodate Zambian state and labour 
demands than global private capital has. This 
has happened in copper mining, in which a 
political synergy between the Zambian state 
and society has emerged during a period 
of rising commodity prices and resource 
nationalism, but not in construction, a sector 
marked by a lack of state strategy and labour 
capacity.
What implications does the distinctness of 
Chinese capital have for labour movements in 
Africa?
CKL: One of the key arguments I made in 
the book is that Chinese state capital is every 
bit as adversarial as global private capital, 
yielding to labour’s demands only under 
extraordinary pressure. Organised labour 
in Africa has the best chance of gaining 
concessions from Chinese state capital 
in sectors that are considered by all the 
stakeholders as strategic, and where workers 
are most organised. My comparison between 
mining and construction makes it very 
clear that it is miners but not construction 
workers who could compel the Chinese to 
reverse the trend of casualisation. This was 
because Chinese state capital, as opposed to 
global private capital, wanted to accumulate 
political capital in addition to financial 
capital, and was more place-bound by its 
desire to access raw materials at their source 
rather than just sell commodities for profits. 
Zambian miners’ collective action, when 
supported by societal and state pressures, 
could therefore yield more concessions from 
Chinese state investors than other private 
ones. In construction, African labour is rather 
disorganised and the construction industry 
is considered of marginal significance to 
Zambia’s national development. Neither 
state nor society rallied behind construction 
workers’ scattered struggles. I guess the 
lesson for African organised labour, as is 
true for African states, is that they have to 
understand the unique sets of imperatives of 
Chinese state investment and develop their 
developmental agendas to engage and bargain 
with China.
This book is also a call for the field of 
China Studies to ‘abandon its methodological 
nationalism’ and reconceptualise China 
globally. Why is this important, and what 
methodological and theoretical reorientations 
does this require?
CKL: Outbound Chinese state capital is just 
one instance of global China. China’s global 
reach is taking many forms in many arenas: 
migration, global media networks, higher 
education, scientific research, regional 
and global multilateral credit institutions, 
expansion of Chinese NGOs abroad, and so 
forth. To understand China’s global impact 
in these areas, scholars cannot artificially 
seal Chinese phenomena within China’s 
geographical borders. This applies not just 
to topics that are intrinsically international 
or regional. Even subjects that may appear 
purely ‘domestic’—such as rural development, 
land grabs, social movements, corruption, 
governance, and elite politics—are seldom 
really so. For instance, land grabs in China 
have their dynamics and causes rooted in the 
Chinese political economy, but they are part of 
a global wave of land dispossession afflicting 
Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, 
partly caused and exacerbated by a new 
round of speculative investment in food 
and agriculture by global financial capital, 
or by state-sponsored projects of building 
global cities. Comparing, connecting, and 
contextualising domestic Chinese phenomena 
with what is happening elsewhere will yield 
deeper and fuller understandings of events 
within China and, more importantly, what 
makes them ‘Chinese’. 
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